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Abstract
The political communication behaviors from both the U.S. voting public and elected
representatives contribute to a political discourse that is typified by hyper partisanship
and extreme polarization (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013). Existing research (e.g.,
Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Haidt, 2012; Westen, 2007) suggested that this is potentially
because U.S. Americans tend to craft persuasive messages that they themselves would
find logically and morally impactful, rather than critically analyzing the positionality and
belief system of their intended audience. Research on Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)
suggested that, for a contemporary rhetor, understanding the moral, ontological, and
ethical precepts that support their opponent’s ideology is crucial to designing persuasive
appeals on moral issues (Haidt, 2012). This thesis sought to identify why the U.S.
citizenry has such a difficult time communicating across political lines and whether the
polarization in U.S. politics is driven from the top-down by political elites or from the
bottom-up by average citizens. Utilizing the Rhetoric of Social Intervention RSI model of
rhetorical analysis (Brown, 1978) as an ideal umbrella under which to unite the insights
of research on political polarization, rural consciousness, populism, framing, social
intuitionism, and MFT, the case study analysis examined the rhetoric of elected political
elites as they debated the qualifications of Betsy DeVos, a contentious nominee for U.S.
cabinet secretary. This study found it is possible for political elites to engage in audiencecentered persuasive attempts, even if those attempts fall on deaf ears. This thesis also
suggests that the centrality of a rhetorically Burkean view of identification as being
central to persuasive success is underemphasized in many explanations of U.S. political
communication. While this thesis is critical of Republican rhetoric during the DeVos
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hearings, this study is more focused on the interplay between the majority and minority
parties in the Senate. Until the fundamentally communicative nature of the polarization
problem is explored, it is unlikely that advocates and politicians will be able to break the
maladaptive, conflict-laden cycle currently typifying American political rhetoric.
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I. Introduction
Many observers of politics were shocked by the election of Donald J. Trump to
the presidency of the United States—even, as it turned out, the candidate himself (see
McCaskill, 2016). The New York Post described Trump’s victory as a “historic upset”
(Schultz, Halper & Fredericks, 2016), and CBS News reported that “much of the world
reacted with shock” (“World reactions,” 2016, para. 1) that Trump, who had no
government experience, had suddenly become the most powerful man in the world.
While “millions of other voters [were] euphoric at the election of a true political outsider
as president” (Healy & Peters, 2016, para. 4), “the fact that Mr. Trump had been endorsed
by a Ku Klux Klan newspaper, even if he rejected it, symbolized the sense of shock that
he would now lead a vibrantly diverse democracy” (para. 15).
The New York Times reported that the surprise victory was due, in part, to three
key factors: “fear of social change; fear of terrorist attacks and other physical threats; and
the crisis of identity that many whites are experiencing as they struggle to maintain their
position” (Taub, 2016, para. 3). Taub (2016) termed the latter “a new kind of populism—
a majoritarian backlash” (para. 3), the electoral power of which the Trump campaign was
particularly effective at harnessing. Trump’s populist appeals resonated deeply with
white Americans whom Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton had referred to
as “a basket of deplorables” (Chozick, 2016, para. 1), and Taub (2016) described as
“those who now are slightly less powerful [because of] the gradual erosion of their
privilege” (para. 25). Benoit (2017) put it succinctly: “No presidential election campaign
in recent memory has been as divisive as 2016” (p. 244).
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But race was not the only issue that won Trump the election. Time speculated that
the “failure of liberals to address the historical roots of white working-class frustration”
(Time Staff, 2016, para. 4) made Trump’s promise to bring back jobs more important
than his controversial statements. Rauch (2016) further explained that the Trump
candidacy, which was light on policy details and heavy on unfounded claims, gained such
broad-based appeal because roughly one-third of U.S. citizens are “politiphobes” (para.
46). These low-information voters believe that political corruption prevents
“commonsense solutions to the country’s problems” (para. 46) from being enacted. These
conditions, combined with the deep unlikeability of both candidates (see, e.g., Benoit,
2017), proved the perfect environment for a political outsider like Trump to mount a
successful populist campaign for the presidency in a system of highly polarized political
rhetoric.
One major outcome of Trump’s election as President of the United States was his
ability to choose cabinet officials and, of all his controversial nominees, education
secretary nominee Elisabeth “Betsy” DeVos was perhaps the most polarizing. DeVos,
known to some as the “four star general of the voucher movement” (Kilgore, 2016, para.
3), drew immediate criticism when her nomination was announced in November 2016.
NPR described DeVos, a billionaire with financial ties to the Republican Party, as a
“lightning rod for Americans’ views about public education” (Sanchez, 2017, para. 1)
DeVos drew the National Education Association’s ire just hours after her nomination was
announced: “Betsy DeVos has consistently worked against [the NEA’s] values, and her
efforts over the years have done more to undermine public education than support
students” (“NEA president reacts,” 2016, para. 4). In a cabinet that The Washington Post
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described as “nothing less than the worst cabinet in American history” (Waldman, 2017,
para. 2), DeVos’ complete lack of experience with public education combined with her
blatant lack of knowledge about basic education policy made her nomination remarkable.
This remarkability was enhanced by the nominee’s disfluent, unconvincing answers to
senators’ questions (see Chappell, 2017). For instance, in response to a question from
Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) about eliminating potential conflicts of interest, DeVos
said:
Well, Senator, first of all let me be very clear about any conflicts: where conflicts
are identified they will be resolved. I will not be conflicted, period. I commit that
to you all, and with respect to the specific ones that you cited, uh, one of them we
were aware of as we entered the process, and that is in the process of being
divested. Where, if there are any others that are identified, they will be
appropriately divested as well. (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary
of Education, 2017, p. 15)
DeVos’ confirmation process, which began with a hearing before the Senate’s Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and culminated with a full debate on the
Senate floor, highlighted the polarization of the United States’ two primary political
parties as DeVos became the first education secretary to need a vice-presidential tiebreaking vote to be confirmed 51-50. This intense showdown between Democrats and
Republicans in the U.S. Senate, often called the world’s greatest deliberative body,
showcased the best and worst of U.S. political communication.
United States senators are far from alone when it comes to exhibiting extreme
political polarization. In 2016, the Pew Research Center found that 45% of Republicans

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

4

and 41% of Democrats said “the other party threatens the nation’s well-being” (p. 5),
suggesting that political divides are perceived not only as frustrating, but also potentially
dangerous. The impact of this division is felt well beyond the halls of Congress, reaching
all the way to state legislatures, community meetings, public protests, and even personal
decisions. In 2016, nearly half of Republicans and a third of Democrats said they’d be
“deeply upset” if one of their children married someone from a different political party, a
major increase in negative partisanship from views a half century ago (McConnell,
Margalit, Malhotra, & Levendusky, 2017, para. 1). Furthermore, rather than
communicating effectively to overcome this polarization, many people in the United
States seem, instead, to become communicatively apprehensive and thereby increase the
pressure on this already strained discourse. For instance, a Marquette University Law
School poll (2012) found that nearly one-in-three Wisconsinites stopped talking to
someone they know about politics because of the 2012 effort to recall Governor Scott
Walker over his union-busting “Budget Repair Bill” (Office of Governor Scott Walker,
2011, para. 1). Issues that previously transcended ideological division, such as the value
of attaining a higher education, have become hot-button issues (Fingerhut, 2017) and
have resisted attempts to reach dialogic or policy solutions. In 2017, the Pew Research
Center found that the number of Republicans who viewed college as a negative influence
on American society increased from 37% in 2015 to 58% (Fingerhut, 2017, para. 3).
These trends, combined with a seeming inability to discuss polarizing political issues,
could, at best, identify a shortcoming in our communication behaviors of the U.S. social
system or, at worst, represent a threat to its survival as a democracy.
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Even as ideological divides sharpen and impact the daily lives of U.S. Americans,
scholars remain split on the source of increasing political animosity. Some scholars of
political science indicate the increasingly polarized rhetoric of partisan elites as the cause
of this national trend (e.g., Abramowitz, 2013; Neiheisel, 2016), while others point to
“polarization and fragmentation” of media (e.g., Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016, p.
1890), regionality (e.g., Cramer, 2016; Peterson, 2007), or reliance on outmoded theories
of political participation leading to government dysfunction (e.g., Rauch & Wittes, 2017).
As it stands, political polarization has been linked to anti-establishment attitudes
(Serazio, 2016) and the rise in populist politics (Maddalena, 2016). While all these
elements undoubtedly factor into the complex web of variables governing American
political behavior, more thorough explanations of this problem can be derived from
viewing the expression of political beliefs as an act of communication because conflict is
performed through communication. Thus, rather than viewing polarization as the result of
conflicting ideas and strategic priorities, researchers should examine the way in which
these differences of opinion are communicated. A renewed focus on how our polarized
political debate became so discordant will provide a better understanding of why it
remains so negative. In a paper examining the divide in liberal and conservative opinions
on policy relating to Israel, Hays Gries (2015) noted that “differing cultural and
socioracial ideologies, and the disparate moral values that underlie them, are the major
drivers of American ideological polarization” (p. 53). This assertion, combined with a
communication-centered lens, leads naturally to an alternative explanation for this
political discord: that messages expressing personal ideologies, which are grounded in
moral beliefs, have emphasized difference and led to highly polarized discourses. These
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conditions allowed Trump, with no political experience, to craft a populist message that
resonated with so many voters.
Ample evidence exists to support the notion that communication behaviors driven
by moral belief systems influence political discourse (see Haidt, 2001, 2007, 2012; Haidt
& Graham, 2007; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012) and that most
communicators send messages that they would find convincing without considering what
would appeal to someone with an opposing ideology (see Feinberg & Willer, 2015). For
example, Feinberg and Willer (2015) found that barely one-in-ten people construct
persuasive political arguments in a way that is likely to appeal to their intended audience.
Instead, the authors found that people “spontaneously craft messages grounded in their
own sense of morality” (p. 1665) rather than moral foundations that would appeal to their
audience. The ways in which liberals and conservatives frame their political
conversations to differently-minded individuals can determine whether their audience is
persuaded to consider a new point of view or becomes more entrenched in its existing
beliefs (e.g., Arbour, 2014; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Lakoff, 1995, 2011; Levasseur,
Sawyer, & Kopacz, 2011; Wagner & Gruszczynski, 2016). The dysfunction that typifies
U.S. political rhetoric is perhaps better described as perceived dysfunction; for some
actor in this social system, sowing dysfunction in political discourse is a means to an end.
If other political actors or citizens, however, are unable to communicate across political
lines because of the entrenched, highly-polarized tenor of national partisan politics, the
ability of a democratic citizenry to debate issues of national importance is severely
inhibited. Instead, an inability to persuade people with different ideologies will lead to
increasingly polarized, unproductive discourses. Until the fundamentally communicative
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nature of the polarization problem is explored, it is unlikely that advocates and politicians
will be able to break the maladaptive, conflict-laden cycle currently typifying U.S.
political rhetoric.
The divide between political ideologies is widening and the widespread inability
to communicate across differences has effects ranging from the way neighbors interact to
the bills that get passed on a federal level, making it a phenomenon desperately in need of
explanation and remedy. The Rhetoric of Social Intervention model (Brown, 1978, 1982,
1986, 1987) provides a lens for analyzing naming conventions, ideologies, and changes
in communication environments over time. This perspective identifies interventions as
attempts to shift the way people perceive situations and, when augmented by Moral
Foundations Theory (see Haidt, 2012) and knowledge of rural consciousness (see
Cramer, 2016), is ideally-suited to an investigation of morally-driven political rhetoric in
a politically polarized epoch. By adopting this methodology, this research aims to analyze
and explain political communication phenomena in the most unified, comprehensive way
possible. Following this (1) introduction, this thesis (2) reviews the current state of
research on political communication and moral rhetoric, (3) outlines a methodology using
the Rhetoric of Social Intervention (RSI) and Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) to
conduct a case study analysis of interventions surrounding Betsy DeVos’s nomination as
Secretary of Education, conducts an RSI and MFT analysis of Republican and
Democratic rhetoric in (4) Betsy DeVos’ HELP Committee hearing, (5) senators’ press
releases about DeVos’ nomination, and (6) speeches on the Senate floor leading up to the
final vote. Following this analysis, this thesis (7) interprets the findings and draws
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political divides.
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II. Literature Review
This literature review begins by summarizing the current state of political
communication and the obstacles that political agents face in affecting persuasion. Then,
it examines relevant scholarship on populism, social intuitionism, Moral Foundations
Theory, and framing to provide information pertinent to this thesis’s methodology.
Reviewing this literature provides crucial insights into contemporary scholarly thought on
communication and political science, a working knowledge of which is necessary to
untangle the relationship between polarization, persuasion, and popular dissatisfaction
with the state of political rhetoric in the United States.
Polarization
Scholars have indicated that structural and cultural changes in the electoral
process have perpetuated the polarization of U.S. political discourse. Much of this change
happened during the primary partisan election cycles, which Hays Gries (2015) argued
have become races to the extremes of each party’s flank as a result of politically safe,
gerrymandered districts:
The only challenge most incumbents face comes from potential primary
challengers within their own party. As a result, the “electoral connection” today
does not mean that politicians heed the opinions of their average constituent.
Instead, most politicians today seek the support of their primary voters—the
ideological extremes of their parties. (p. 75)
Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2014) similarly noted that this polarization has the effect of
alienating moderate or centrist candidates who cannot find support from primary voters,
who tend to have more partisan bias than general election voters. Abramowitz (2013)
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observed that the overwhelming majority of the partisan divide has come “from the
rightward shift in the location of the average Republican” (p. 712), driven by ideological
differences with Democrats over “the size of the welfare state and role of the federal
government in the economy” (p. 710). The fundamental disagreement over the role of
government that drives the hyper-partisan primary election cycle is one explanation many
scholars identified for the difficulty that comes when attempting to persuade citizens with
opposing political views (see Feinberg & Willer, 2015). Additionally, U.S. governmental
institutions lack the expectation of “loyal opposition,” a British parliamentary tradition in
which the minority party is obligated to faithfully hold the majority in check just as the
majority respects the minority’s indispensable as a check against tyranny by a slim
majority (see Webber [2017] for more on loyal opposition). These ideological and
structural impediments have contributed to public dissatisfaction with the tenor of
debates in Congress.
While electoral forces have undoubtedly changed the nature of political discourse,
taxonomic branding may have significantly influenced the ways both parties sell
themselves to their audiences (Neiheisel, 2016). For instance, Democrats have failed to
embrace the “liberal” label with which Republicans assail them (Neiheisel, 2016).
Although presidents such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John Fitzgerald Kennedy
embraced the “liberal” label as a positive description, the 1964 presidential election
marked a distinct demarcation in the use of this descriptor. Republican presidential
candidate Barry Goldwater ran a campaign based on the definition of “conservative” as a
counter to liberalism (Neiheisel, 2016), while President Lyndon Baines Johnson
eschewed Kennedy’s embrace of the liberal identifier (Ellis & Stimson, 2009). This lack
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of unifying identity for Democrats, combined with the Republican propensity for using
“liberal” as a pejorative moniker, has resulted in Democrats’ inability to “make sense of
the political world” (Neiheisel, 2016, p. 418) and explain themselves to prospective
voters. Consequently, many conservatives don’t consider “liberalism” an ideological
position that indicates serious policy positions, but rather a “lifestyle brand” identified
more by “views on issues like abortion and gay rights than their views on taxes”
(Nunberg, 2007, p. 61). As conservatives renamed what it meant to be a “liberal” from a
policy-driven ideology to a stance on social issues, rural areas—historically slower to
adapt to social changes than more heavily-populated urban areas—became even less
likely to embrace liberalism. Liberals’ inability to rename themselves appears to have
affected state-level Democrats as well, as only three states had state legislatures in which
Democrats and Republicans shared control after the 2012 elections (Abramowitz, 2013).
Republicans, conversely, have adopted neo-liberal rhetoric emphasizing the market-based
language of capitalism as a grand strategy for their political communication (see Foust &
Lair, 2012; Giroux, 2005; Peck, 2015; Serazio, 2016; Shin & Park, 2016). The
hegemonic influence of neo-liberal Republicanism has even seeped into Democratic
rhetoric, and the lack of a clear, articulated response to this conservative ideological
system is one potential theme scholars have identified as a contributing factor to
Republican electoral supremacy.
Understanding and tapping into the political resentment of rural voters is another
way that political elites may influence political discussions or promote political divide,
regardless of whether or not they sincerely represent those interests. The rural-urban
divide that is often translated into red and blue areas on electoral maps has received its
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share of blame for the conflicting values that drive the polarized climate, but relatively
little is known about the role of rural identity in politics. While some scholarship has
equated rural identity with traditional conservative tropes like “firearm ownership, … the
importance of personal responsibility, and a limited role for government” (McGinty,
Wolfson, Sell, & Webster, 2016, p. 6), the equivalency of rural and conservative,
however, is not the full picture. As Cramer (2016) exhibited through a series of
interviews with existing social groups throughout rural and urban areas of Wisconsin, a
more apt description of this rural identity is rural consciousness. Cramer (2016) describes
rural consciousness as having three tenets:
(1) a belief that rural areas are ignored by decision makers, including policy
makers, (2) a perception that rural areas do not get their fair share of resources,
and (3) a sense that rural folks have fundamentally distinct values and lifestyles,
which are misunderstood and disrespected by city folks. (p. 12)
While identity politics typically focuses on class and race, Cramer (2016) argued that
place must also be discussed to explain the electoral differences between rural and urban
areas. Possessing rural consciousness, Cramer asserted, is a result of active sense-making
rather than an effect of conservative or Republican values such as “economic injustice,
place identity, class identity, race, and values” (p. 89). Though Republican policies tend
to benefit corporations and wealthy individuals more so than rural individuals, Cramer
(2016) found that Republicans have been more effective at “tapping into existing
resentments” (p. 222) than Democrats, and have helped rural individuals blame “not
affluent people, but rather, the government, the people that work for it, and urban areas
that are home to liberals and people of color” (p. 222) for the discontentment. Wisconsin
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Governor Scott Walker is a prime example of a politician who “tapped into the economic
anxiety and dread… [and] made use of the desire for people to make sense of their
world” (p. 207). This skill, per Cramer’s (2016) definition, constituted playing into a
politic of resentment for political gain (see also, Hochschild, 2016; Vance, 2016).
Yet another complicating factor in the ecology of modern political
communication that has promoted polarization is the advent of social media, which has
greatly impacted the ability of candidates and political parties to reach potential voters
with messages. Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2014) identified a key psychological
tendency that makes the volume and variety of perspectives available to social media
users so problematic: media consumers on all sides of the ideological spectrum “believe
the facts that support their predispositions even when they are not real facts” (p. 242).
These findings support decades of research on confirmation bias and selective exposure
theory, or the idea that “exposure to counterattitudinal information that produces
dissonance can lead to polarization in favor of preexisting ideas” (Vraga, 2015, p. 488).
Though not a new phenomenon, the effects of selective exposure have the potential to
become even more virulent in the age of social media (see Westerwick, Johnson, &
Knobloch-Westerwick (2017) for more on selective exposure). Social media, which
provide egalitarian platforms for all “news” sources regardless of their legitimacy and
rigor, have led to the deprofessionalization of news sources, fragmentation of
perspectives and information, and highly-individualized randomization of previously
predictable patterns of political information processing (Donsbach & Brade, 2011).
Fragmentation, which most directly affects “politically interested” (p. 519) media
consumers, leads to partisan “echo chambers” (p. 512) that serve more to confirm
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existing biases than provide opportunities for critical engagement with political
complexities.
While social media use and news consumption are potential habits that may lead
to political persuasion, Diehl, Weeks, and Gil de Zúñiga (2016) found that persuasion, or
the shift of political opinions as a result of exposure to political discourse, can occur only
when individuals’ social media networks contain “exposure to discussion disagreement”
(p. 1890) rather than homogenized networks of like-minded friends and news sources.
This presents a confounding variable for communication practitioners seeking to
influence undecided voters or political moderates, as platforms like Facebook allow users
to “unfollow” or “unfriend” users whose political views may diverge from their own.
Donsbach and Brade (2015) found the result is “randomization” (p. 512), or the
decreasing likelihood that social media users encounter similar, accurate sets of
information. For high-potential voting blocs like young people or the politicallydisinterested, who typically participate at lower rates but could make a considerable
difference if activated, network homogeneity and the randomization effect have made it
increasingly difficult for political operatives to reach these demographics with a single,
mass message. While social media randomization has decreased these voters’ openness to
political persuasion by exposing them mainly to people with similar opinions, it has also
provided the technology necessary to target sought after demographics with paid
advertisements. The paradox of this splintered media landscape poses major challenges to
political candidates and parties, while also providing them with opportunities to take
advantage of the political polarization of American voters.
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Populism
As the U.S. social system has become increasingly polarized politically, scholars
have suggested that populism has benefitted from this rise. Scholars have noticed themes
of populist rhetoric becoming highly influential in recent major campaigns (see Jutel,
2016; Maddalena, 2016; Rauch & Wittes, 2017), often accompanied by antiestablishment rhetoric (Serazio, 2016) and appeals to a grassroots sensibility (Penney,
2012). Populism, traditionally seen as the “act of articulating ‘the people’” (Jutel, 2016,
p. 1132) to constitute a candidacy representative of popular interests, has evolved as a
concept and in practice from the time of the American Revolution. While theoretical
populism focuses on sincere representation of voters’ beliefs, the real-world application
of this concept appears to have been more opportunistically applied. Rauch and Wittes
(2017) identified modern anti-institutional populism as populist campaign rhetoric that
seizes upon a public’s “instinctive suspicion of anything or anyone deemed ‘elite’” (p. 8),
whether or not a candidate is a member of that same elite class or would benefit from the
perpetuation of the existing power system. While populist candidates may represent a
coalescence of popular ideological concerns and ideals, modern anti-institutional
populists leverage popular sentiment against the current government derived from their
supporters’ anti-elitism. Therefore, populism as a representation of the electorate’s vision
for the country is separate from modern anti-institutional populism, which takes
advantage of popular support on one issue alone—an anti-elitist mistrust of government.
Though populist, anti-establishment rhetoric may actually represent an effort by
common people to undo the influence of out-of-touch politicians and bureaucrats, Serazio
(2016) argued that establishment politicians sometimes employ these sentiments to attract
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voters who are disillusioned with government. This strategy has been a favorite among
“establishment” politicians who rebrand themselves as “outsiders” and seek to use the
discontentment of voters to maintain their control over the very institutions with which
their constituents are dissatisfied. As such, Serazio (2016) defined contemporary
populism not as a sincere attempt to represent voters, but as “an act of co-optation.” “It
appropriates an outsider image on behalf of insiders and inveighs against power
concentrated in the Capitol while eliding any response to power that might be
concentrated in capital” (p. 181). This cynical understanding of populism as “rhetorical
manipulations by hegemonic forces” (p. 181-182) recasts candidates ranging from former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to former Texas governor Rick Perry—who have
strategically critiqued the “powers that be”—as opportunistic by pointing out they neglect
to acknowledge their own agency in the present power structure. This is what Rauch and
Wittes (2017) would call modern anti-institutional populism.
Another set of factors impacting a polarized audience’s susceptibility to political
persuasion are its levels of education and information consumption. Johansen and Joslyn
(2008) noted that “more educated people… call upon many sources of information and
possess a greater mass of stored information that can be utilized to question and counter
new information” (p. 592), making them “less likely to be persuaded” (p. 592) by
propaganda. Constituencies lacking a strong educational background are more vulnerable
to manipulation, because they are less likely to research political claims they hear and
routinely encounter fewer sources of information (Arthos, 2013). Such audiences have
included ethno-centric Europeans fearful of increased immigration (Maddalena, 2016)
and disaffected white Americans, typically without college degrees, who supported
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Trump’s candidacy for president (see Carnes & Lupu, 2017). Though these populations
are more the subjects of changing circumstances than they are of systematic oppression,
Freire (1968/2000) noted that, “conditioned by the experience of oppressing others, any
situation other than their former seems to them like oppression” (p. 57).
Regardless of whether or not candidates for office self-identify as populists,
scholars have found that most candidates often try to create the sense that theirs is a
grassroots movement, which could be considered a form of support for their persuasive
credibility. Penney (2012) explained that the proliferation of political campaign materials
that can be worn or displayed on bodies is an attempt to signify a grassroots movement is
at play. By turning their bodies into “body-texts” (p. 2324), campaign supporters put a
face and physical presence to the ideas embodied in a campaign. When populist
campaign symbols are featured prominently at campaign rallies and media coverage of
events, outsiders are left with the perception that the ideas represented by the candidate or
organization are ubiquitous throughout the culture (Penney, 2012).
Scholarly research has also indicated that populist politicians gain considerable
persuasive power by striking a chord with the intended audience and creating the illusion
of sameness between candidate and voter. Donsbach and Brade (2011) explained that
“the four main factors leading to political judgments—party identification, issues,
candidate images, and moods—has shifted toward the latter. More and more ad hoc
judgments based, often unconsciously, on these subtle cues—are pivotal in this process”
(p. 513). Westen (2007) concurred, noting that many modern campaigns—particularly by
Democratic candidates—conceptualize the process of political persuasion as one taking
place in a “dispassionate mind that makes decisions by weighing the evidence and
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reasoning to the most valid conclusions” despite the fact that this “bears no relation to
how the mind and brain actually work” (p. ix). Rather, Kim, Rao, and Lee (2009) found
that message orientation, or the degree to which a candidate explained issues in a way
similar to how audiences thought of the issues, played a greater role in whether or not the
intended audiences successfully received messages than did the quality of argumentation
or facts presented. Candidates and organizations whose messages best matched the
orientation of the audience toward the issues created “fluency” in the audience’s minds,
which “leads to a sense of ‘feeling right’” (p. 879), giving an advantage to candidates
who carefully attend to communication best practices when designing persuasive
messages. A politician with broad appeal, whose messages match the message orientation
of their audiences and send signals that can be interpreted positively by multiple
audiences, stands at a distinct advantage in the modern era. Westen (2007) acknowledged
the highly subjective nature of reality, and indicated that rhetors sending political
messages should recognize this simple fact as they approach their audiences:
You can slog it out for those few millimeters of cerebral turf that process facts,
figures, and policy statements. Or you can take your campaign to the broader
neural electorate, collecting delegates throughout the brain and targeting different
emotional states with messages designed to maximize their appeal. (p. 88)
In other words, candidates that establish an emotional connection with their audience
before attempting to convince them with evidence and data are more likely to have their
messages received than those who jump straight to facts.
While implementing evidence-driven reforms may increase the likelihood of
politically persuasive messages being received as intended, some scholars have argued
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that invoking populism and increasing voter participation should not be the primary
“ends” sought by contemporary politicians hoping to improve political systems. Rauch
and Wittes (2017) argued that the folk theory of democracy, which states that “more
public involvement will produce more representative and thus more effective and
legitimate governance” (p. 3), is a widely held belief on both sides of the political
spectrum. What many well-intentioned proponents of democratic participation miss, they
argue, is that the folk theory “has a deep tendency to disappoint in practice” (p. 3). And,
when elections do not go as party elites expect them to, the response is often to doubledown on the idea that more participation would have yielded a different result. However,
the “paradox of populism” (p. 12) is that “decades of reforms that emphasize
individualism at the expense of institutions have had the paradoxical effect of heightening
partisanship while weakening parties, a recipe for polarization and chaos” (p. 12). By
deemphasizing the importance of political professionals, like policy experts, career
bureaucrats, and party organizations, major policy decisions are left in the hands of
politicians in the midst of a perpetual reelection cycle without the time or expertise to
adequately comprehend the complexities of the work at hand (Rauch & Wittes, 2017;
Serazio, 2016; Tonon, 2008). To compensate for this inability to learn the nuances of all
policy proposals that cross their desks, Tonon (2008) argued that representatives should
“hire policy analysts... request assistance from the permanent staff of their committees,
or… call upon any number of bureaucratic agencies to provide information” (p. 278).
This argument echoes Meltsner (1976), who reasoned that policy analysts were a
necessity for representative democracy, which faces perpetual turnover as a result of
staggered election cycles, but these ‘establishment bureaucrats’ are often demonized by
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populist candidates as one reason Washington and state capitols are dysfunctional. As a
result, Rauch and Wittes (2017) found that the administrative state has been weakened in
favor of the policy opinions of “rationally ignorant” voters who have no reason to fully
comprehend the complexities of legislative policies. The answer they proposed is to cease
the demonization and neglect of “intermediation by professionals, experts, and
institutions” (p. 13) and reinject the knowledge that politics requires a level of experience
and institutional memory to adequately represent the voters in public discussion.
Though a host of factors have been found to affect the quality of political
discourse in the United States, one constant has become clear: communication. To
understand the nature of polarized political discourse in America, all the existing
scholarship points to the communication-mediated nature of political ideologies as
paramount. Whether it is the nature and quality of news that consumers rely on
(Donsbach & Brade, 2011; Johansen & Joslyn, 2008), the names that ideologies ascribed
to themselves (Neiheisel, 2016), or the ways in which professional bureaucrats and
analysts were demonized (Rauch & Wittes, 2017), it is clear that political persuasion is
affected by considerably more variables than which politicians present the best facts. To
better understand the factors that impact political persuasion, the next section will
examine the traditional methods of explaining how and why humans respond to some
messages better than others.
Framing, Social Intuitionism, and Moral Foundations
Having established the current state of scholarly research on political persuasion
and populism, the next step toward understanding why Americans have such difficulty
communicating about contentious political issues comes from analyzing the cognitive and
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linguistic factors that make some messages more appealing than others. To accomplish
this goal, this section will examine three different perspectives on message effectiveness
that will contribute to interpretation of the communication behaviors in the case study.
Beginning with its modern roots in framing, this section is a chronological examination
of the social intuitionist perspective on affective decision making, Moral Foundations
Theory, and the explanations for political behavior they provide.
The concept of framing has had considerable utility in multiple disciplines, but
the communication and social psychology perspectives have proven most useful for
maximizing the effectiveness of political persuasion. Hallahan (1999) noted that framing
is a “rich and useful concept,” but “[its] meaning…varies based on the research question”
(p. 209) and discipline, and therefore requires better operationalization. Entman (1993)
further remarked upon the “fractured paradigm” (p. 51) of framing, but provided a
specific definition that is useful for this research: “to select some aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation” (p. 52). In short, Entman (1993) depicted framing as the process of
defining the scope of a problem, selecting related information, and increasing that
information’s salience in the mind of an audience. Lakoff (1995) applied such a practice
of framing to the discursive practices of Democrats and Republicans and identified the
predominant metaphors employed by each party. Republicans, whose foundation
emphasized “moral strength” and a good-versus-evil view of the world, follow the “Strict
Father Model” (p. 191), according to Lakoff. This perspective frames the world as a
dangerous place and depicts a family wherein the “father has the primary responsibility
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for setting overall family policy” because he “support[s] his family and protect[s] it from
evils” (p. 191). Lakoff (1995) acknowledged that this is a paternalistic paradigm that
emphasizes respect for authority, hierarchal communication with a high power distance,
and an emphasis on shared moral values. Ideas that threaten this conceptualization of the
world in this good-versus-evil framework are inherently evil, and “the metaphor entails
that one cannot respect the views of one’s adversary: Evil does not deserve respect; it
deserves to be attacked!” (p. 186). Conversely, the Democrats’ metaphor follows “The
Nurturant Parent Model,” which emphasizes “being cared for and cared about, having
one’s desires for loving interactions met, living as happily as possible, and deriving
meaning from one's community and from caring for and about others” (Lakoff, 1995, p.
197). This model, which focuses on emotional health and growth, stands in stark contrast
to the strict conservative frame. The primary strength of Lakoff’s (1995) identification of
liberal and conservative frames was in its illustrative capacity and focus on metaphor:
Liberals are less insightful than conservatives at recognizing that morality and the
family lie at the center of their political universe. The cost to liberals has been
enormous. Where conservatives have organized effectively in a unified way to
promote all their values, liberals misunderstood their politics as being about
coalitions of interest groups and so have remained divided and unable to compete
effectively with conservatives. (p. 202)
Lakoff’s (1995) assertion that liberals are less adept at presenting their ideology in a
unified, understandable way mirrors Neiheisel’s (2016) contention that Democrats have
been unable to rebrand themselves after conservatives began using “liberal” as a
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pejorative term, and it also suggests that this situation can be improved by consciously
altering the party’s linguistic and communicative behavior.
Framing has provided a key language for dissecting political rhetoric and helped
reify some existing hypotheses on political rhetoric. Arbour (2014) used framing to
identify key “issue frames” (p. 604) used by each party that were influenced by the
“partisanship of the candidate and the partisanship of the voters” (p. 605). For instance,
this research found that both parties emphasize jobs in their public discourse, but
Democrats “tie their argument to tax policy, decrying tax breaks given to companies that
send jobs overseas” while Republicans are “much more locally focused, as they talk
about keeping jobs ‘here’” (p. 614) and policies that could accomplish that goal. A
similar division of focus between Democrats and Republicans was found on issues
ranging from healthcare and terrorism to energy and immigration. These findings
bolstered Simon and Jerit’s (2007) assertion that each party’s “elites use distinctive
vocabularies when advancing their political agenda” (p. 265) (see also, Domke et al.
(2000) on source cues). Similarly and like Westen’s (2007) critique of Democrats’
fondness for the “dispassionate mind” (p. ix) theory, Lakoff (2011) used framing analysis
to assert that Democrats’ metaphor for the world did not adequately match the moral
strength of the Republicans’ perspective:
Liberals tend to believe that if they just tell people the facts about their policies,
the public will reach the right conclusion. It doesn’t work like that. The result is
that conservative morally-based communications are more effective in changing
brains than are liberal policy-based communications. Conservatives have built a
wondrous framing and communication system, but progressives have not. (p. 185)
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The functional importance of this observation was portrayed in McGinty et al.’s (2016)
analysis of rhetoric supporting universal background checks for firearms purchases,
which found that “while proponents of universal background checks used fact-based
messages in support of the policy, opponents often used rights-based messages designed
to activate the core values of politically active gun owners and conservatives” (p. 33).
Though useful to the extent that it helped identify divergent frames in action, Pinker
argued—in a series of rejoinders and responses with Lakoff—that Lakoff’s reliance on
metaphor as a foundational element of framing represented “dubious” brain science
(Pinker & Lakoff, 2007, p. 60). “The implication that frames, by being ‘physically fixed’
in the brain, are especially insidious or hard to change is gratuitous” (p. 60), Pinker
argued, indicating that Lakoff’s model may explain the “what” of framing with regard to
political rhetoric, but failed to adequately explain the “why” and “how” in satisfactory
terms.
The application of the social intuitionist perspective to the study of political
rhetoric helped fill in the gaps left by framing while also adding psychological validity to
the claims of communication theories on naming. The increased prevalence of this
viewpoint has been driven in larger part by Jonathan Haidt in a series of publications and
co-authored works over the past 20 years. Haidt (2001) addressed the history of theories
on reasoning before making the case for the social intuitionist perspective. For much of
psychological and communicative history, scholars have posited that humans reach
decisions on moral matters through a process of conscious reasoning; that is, weighing
the facts and information before making a decision. Haidt (2001) argued that research on
heuristic processing and focus groups suggests otherwise, as he wrote that “moral

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

25

judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex
post facto moral reasoning” (p. 817). A moral intuition “can be defined as the sudden
appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (goodbad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of
searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (p. 818). Moral reasoning,
conversely, is a conscious process that only occurs when it is necessary to back up the
conclusion of a moral intuition. Haidt (2001) illustrated this idea with the metaphor of
“the emotional dog and its rational tail” (p. 814). The “emotional dog” represents human
reactions to most situations: they are automatic, based on instantaneous reactions to
stimuli. The tail, conversely, represents the minority of times when humans engage in
conscious, rational reasoning processes. A rhetor pitching an argument to their audience
based on the assumption that they will be convinced by rational arguments and statistics
is tantamount to expecting the tail to “wag-the-dog” (p. 823). Rather, to be successful, the
social intuitionist model proposed that the rhetor must first elicit a positive emotional
response before the dog would wag its tail. In a later book on the subject, Haidt (2012)
applied this same concept to the metaphor of an elephant and its rider; attempts to
convince the rational rider with logic are no good if you have angered the emotional
elephant.
In Haidt’s studies, humans seem to make post-hoc rationalizations for their moral
intuitions when they are asked to explain why they made one decision over another. In
his research, Haidt (2001) found that people “cite factors that could not have mattered”
(p. 822) in explaining their decision making processes. These conclusions, rather, come
from “a priori moral theories” or “a pool of culturally supplied norms for evaluating and

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

26

criticizing the behavior of others” (p. 822) through which we name experiences. Instead
of recognizing their arguments as rationalizations for moral intuitions, based on little
more than a feeling, Haidt (2001) argued that respondents act as attorneys and reverseengineer a case that sounds convincing. Political communication has offered multiple
explanations for the reasons voters support candidates whose policy positions do not best
represent the voters’ interests. When viewed within the context of social intuitionist
theories about moral decision making, Maddalena’s (2016) assertion that a leader seems
reputable when “you feel that she is right insofar as she is sincere and makes you feel
cared for” (p. 249) takes on an additional layer of meaning. If “feeling right” is as
important as this research suggests, an application of the social intuitionist perspective
indicates that such political maneuvers may be successful, at least in part, because they
cater to the brain’s predisposition toward making snap judgements based on “momentary
flashes of feeling” (Haidt, 2001, p. 825). This research aligns with Stephen Colbert’s
concept of “truthiness,” which began as a joke on his satirical television show and later
became Merriam-Webster’s 2006 word of the year (Lakoff, 2017). Truthiness is “the
quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts
known to be true,” which Lakoff (2017) argued is “very much in competition with
‘truth’” (p. 604). Therefore, the rhetor who not only matches the communication
“orientation” (Kim et al., 2009, p. 879) of their audience but also designs messages that
appeal to the audience’s moral predilections are more likely to be received favorably,
providing political communication practitioners and scholars with a new tool for
evaluating message effectiveness (see also, Westen [2007] on heuristics).
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The renaissance of social intuitionism provided the basis for Moral Foundations
Theory (MFT), which formalized an understanding of the symbolically-constituted major
moral precepts through which human beings filter their experience. Haidt and Joseph
(2004) asserted that “human beings come equipped with an intuitive ethics, an innate
preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events
involving other human beings” (p. 56). These “flashes of affect” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004,
p. 63) are the natural and automatic response to situations for which communication
scripts and narratives are often invoked, and they are particularly influential when dealing
with morally-charged situations. Intuitive ethics are formed mostly in childhood, and
developed throughout humanity as an evolutionary response to living in a dangerous
world. Haidt and Graham (2007) refined Haidt and Joseph’s (2004) findings and
identified five major foundations upon which moral beliefs are constructed: harm/care,
fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Research has
found that political liberals react instinctively to moral messages that utilize the
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, whereas conservatives are affected by all
five elements (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007). As a result,
Haidt and Graham (2007) argued that conservatives have moral “motivations that liberals
may not recognize as moral at all” (p. 103). This research inherently suggested that
designing an effective appeal to an opponent—or anyone, for that matter—begins with
identifying the moral foundation(s) upon which their belief rests.
Successful persuasion in the current era of political communication should
consider the moral foundations held by the intended audience, as liberal non-recognition
of conservative moral issues may serve only to further inflame differences. For instance,
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Haidt and Graham (2007) illustrated how liberal defenses of diversity under the
fairness/equality foundation may alienate conservatives who hold fast to the
symbolically-constituted virtues of the ingroup/loyalty foundation:
Most cultures therefore have constructed virtues such as loyalty, patriotism, and
heroism (usually a masculine virtue expressed in defense of the group). From this
point of view, it is hard to see why diversity should be celebrated and increased,
while rituals that strengthen group solidarity (such as a pledge of allegiance to the
national flag) should be challenged in court. According to ingroup-based
moralities, dissent is not patriotic (as some American bumper-stickers suggest);
rather, criticizing one’s ingroup while it is engaged in an armed conflict with
another group is betrayal or even treason. (p. 105)
Similar analyses can be performed for each of the three moral foundations that
conservatives hold and liberals are less likely to view as moral (ingroup/loyalty,
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity). Haidt and Graham (2007) hypothesized that moral
concerns over purity, which can manifest as racism, discrimination, or intolerance, “can
be traced to a purity module evolved to deal with the adaptive challenges of life in a
world full of dangerous microbes and parasites” (p. 60). The negative flash of affect
associated with racism, therefore, could be understood not as merely a dislike or
preference but a reaction based on purity that “trigger[s] flashes of disgust at the
‘dirtiness’ of certain groups” (p. 63). The idea that racism, bigotry, and homophobia may
be an automatic response to an evolutionarily-developed desire to preserve the self and
one’s ingroup from out-group threats recontextualizes the assumptions of persuasive
appeals that seek to change those beliefs. With this in mind, Hibbing et al. (2014)
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encouraged their readers to recognize that “the main reason your political opponents hold
the views they do is not laziness, a lack of information, or willfully bad judgment, but
rather physiological and psychological contours that are fundamentally different from
yours” (p. 255). Haidt and Graham’s (2007) assertion that liberals do not recognize all of
the conservative foundations—ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity—
provided support for this claim.
Weber and Federico (2013) furthered this understanding of partisan moral
tendencies when they noted that libertarians “more closely resemble the issue positions of
liberals” (p. 121), causing a reexamination of how these foundations develop. Weber and
Federico’s (2013) observation supported Haidt and Graham’s (2007) contention that
liberal and libertarian foundations evolved from the “ethic of autonomy” (p. 102), which
Haidt (2012) called the liberty model, a potential sixth foundation. Conservatives, on the
other hand, possess a morality that came from the ethics of “community” (p. 102) and
“divinity” (p. 103). The autonomy ethic assumes the moral world is “made up exclusively
of individual human beings” (p. 102), and therefore identifies behaviors as “moral” if
they enhance individual freedoms. Inversely, the ethics of community and divinity
identify moral behaviors as those which protect the integrity of longstanding institutions,
whether corporate, familial, or religious. The ethics of community and divinity undergird
the final three moral foundations (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity)
which therefore identify “duty, respect, loyalty, and interdependence” as virtues (p. 102).
Research on MFT suggested that, for a contemporary rhetor, understanding the moral,
ontological, and ethical precepts that support their opponent’s ideology is crucial to
designing persuasive appeals on moral issues.

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

30

After a review of literature on the communicative and scientific behaviors that
demonstrate the instantaneous, affective nature of human moral decision making, MFT
provides a relevant approach for understanding how values and heuristic processing
function in political persuasion. Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, and Hatemi (2017)
cautioned, however, that MFT is not an explanation of “the causes (emphasis in original)
of ideology” (p. 435) but rather works best “for framing investigations on the
consequences (emphasis in original) of ideology” (p. 435). This synthesis of framing and
social intuitionism should be a fundamental part of analysis in a deconstruction of
contemporary political rhetoric, which is the focus of the following section.
Rhetoric of Social Intervention
The Rhetoric of Social Intervention (Brown, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1987) is a
communication model with broad utility in discursive analysis. In particular, it can guide
research on the ways in which rhetors attempt to shift attention and compensate for gaps
in ideologies. The model, developed by rhetorical theorist William R. Brown, considers
communication and the human condition to be a process of constant sense-making. The
model and Brown’s research builds upon Kenneth Burke’s theories on rhetoric, which
contend that “man is the symbol-using animals” (Burke, 1966, p. 1). Brown (1978)
argued that the uncertainty inherent to human existence inhibited the ability of the species
to adequately predict and cope with challenges. The human experience, then, is a process
of sense-making through the creation of shared symbols, or a “symbolic reality.”
Associated with a unique propensity of the human being to categorize experience
so that it seems repeatable, ideology is grounded in the abstracting process
common to all symbol-making… The world we conceive of is an arbitrated one—
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(1) by our very senses, (2) by our reification of some ‘kinds’ and not others, and
(3) by the tacitly agreed-upon rules (emphasis in original) for constituting ‘kinds.’
(p. 125)
Brown refers to this process as naming, or “symbolically categorizing these [human]
experiences” (Opt & Gring, 2009, p. 4) to make shareable the conceptual and physical
features of the lived “reality” they experienced. For example, Brown identified the
components of the “American Dream” ideology, including “freedom, equality,
individualism, and pursuit of happiness” (Opt & Gring, 2009, p. 16), which all take on a
common meaning based on the shared experiences of U.S. Americans. Importantly,
however, Brown (1978) noted that the perception that these ideas, such as freedom or
equality, have a set, common meaning—or even exist—is fallacious. Rather, Brown
(1978) argued that these abstract concepts have been code-switched into reality, meaning
that the individuals “‘forget’ that [they] created the connection between the internal
symbolic category and external experience” (Opt & Gring, 2009, p. 41) and are only
treating abstractions as concrete (see also, Leach [1976] for more on code-switching).
The first step to persuading someone to see a different point of view, from this
perspective, is to introduce doubt in how they have interpreted the world as they have
named and made sense of it. Changing interpretation of social systems, needs, and issues,
therefore, is a process of communicating across different reified kinds and names to
explain experiences that are not adequately covered by existing naming systems.
In RSI, human proclivities toward naming and categorizing their experiences
through symbols and signs to create an illusion of stability make them ideological beings.
A collection of operationalized names and kinds form or constitute an “ideology,” or a
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“symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate ‘name’ human beings can
comprehensively order their experience” (Brown, 1978, p. 124). Brown (1978) further
asserted that ideologies are not only collections of names but organizing forces that have
the property of ultimacy, in that the adherence to an ideology is also the adherence to a
“superordinate symbolic construction of ‘reality’ with ‘order,’ ‘coherence,’ and ‘system’”
(p. 126) that predicts or explains a multiplicity of positions on a variety of issues. For
instance, people who name themselves environmentalists would likely also have coherent
views about concepts like recycling—a necessity—or greenhouse gases—the cause of
climate change—that correspond to their ideological system. On the other hand, persons
subscribing to a climate change denying ideology might name recycling an “unviable
liberal program” and view greenhouse gases as a “myth propagated by corrupt
scientists.”
However, the unknowability of “reality” means that the work of naming is always
incomplete. Names and ideologies are formed by backgrounding or foregrounding
attention to experience rhetorically (Opt & Gring, 2009). When ideologies conflict with
one another, as in the debate between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” views on abortion
rights, conflict stems from the differences in what communicators foreground, or make
relevant, and background, ignore in their talk. This contention is analogous to the
complementary issue frames liberals and conservatives form to convey policy differences
(see also, Arbour (2014) on framing). Code-switched ideologies are also operational
when considering the operation of MFT’s flashes of affect. When confronted with a
moral argument, people do not stop to consider whether their view of the world is
accurate; they simply react unconsciously based on what they believe to be true. In this
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way, names act as a trigger that prompts a taken-for-granted response learned through
language. Brown (1978) contended that gaps in a naming system result in deviance, or
“the difference between what our ideology leads us to expect will happen in experience
and what actually seems to happen” (Opt & Gring, 2009, p. 83). As symbolic
abstractions, ideologies are inherently incomplete and are subsequently vulnerable to
reinterpretation by parties with competing ideological explanations for experience. In this
way, an ideology with greater explanatory power may subsume the place of one that
failed to prevent gaps in understanding, while an unsuccessful attempt at reinterpreting a
vulnerable ideology may only emphasize deviance. This state of affairs leads to what
Brown (1978) termed deviance amplification, in which deviance within an ideology goes
unresolved and devolves into vicious cycles of unproductive discourse.
Interventions, then, are attempts at provoking or preventing an attention shift, or a
“periodic refocusing of attention... compensatory to symbolic gaps and vicious cycles”
(p. 135), to replace or update ideological names so as to resolve deviance. As a result, the
RSI model provides a method for explaining the political partisanship that typifies U.S.
politics. Populism can be understood not only as a strategy aimed at resonating with
audiences on an emotional level, but as a political strategy that proposes the best ideology
for making sense of the world. Political candidates who fail to persuade concerned
audiences to see their point of view proposed unsuccessful interventions. Polarization is
not only a matter of disagreement over policy priorities, but a process of deviance
amplification that becomes a vicious cycle when each side insists that their interpretation
of enacting an ideology is the only or “most perfect” one, despite inevitable anomalies.
RSI model language adds a level of specificity that framing does not provide and may
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therefore better inform advocates intent upon changing perceptions on charged issues.
Additionally, identifying the actors in a social system impacted by rhetorical
interventions may increase researchers’ ability to predict the direction of a social system,
such as whether or not the system seems likely to descend into a vicious cycle or,
conversely, escape deviance amplification.
Brown’s RSI (1978, 1982, 1986, 1987) identified that interventions can attempt to
provoke attention shifts in three subsystems which are assumed to constitute ideological
systems: attention, need, and power. An attempted intervention in the subsystem of
attention would strive to change what aspects of experience are backgrounded or
foregrounded rhetorically by a communicator to explain anomalies. Anomaly-featuring
communication would highlight the elements of ideas or objects that are not adequately
defined by their name, while anomaly-masking communication would try to cover up the
deficiencies of the naming system. Pro-choice advocates, for example, would engage in
anomaly-featuring communication if they began calling pro-life activists anti-woman
activists, thereby highlighting the hypocrisy of protecting unborn babies at the expense of
their mothers’ autonomy. Pro-life activists who refer to unborn children as babies rather
than fetuses would be engaging in anomaly-masking communication, by glossing over
the difference between an unborn mass of cells and a human person. An intervention in
the need subsystem would attempt to shift attention rhetorically about “what we need and
do not need” (p. 60). Humans have biosocial needs—that Brown (1987) indicated are
essential for human survival and acceptance and are expressed through communication—
as well as symbolically created needs, which are not physically necessary for survival but
are constituted through code-switching. For example, the need for food, water, and
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shelter and the names used to describe them communicate biosocial needs, while
symbolically created needs like comfortability and satisfaction are abstract but have been
code-switched into concrete needs. Finally, an intervention in the power subsystem
would attempt to re- or de-emphasize the relational interdependence between individuals
or groups. These relationships are either reciprocal, in which multiple parties share equal
influence over each other, or complementary, in which one party dominates the other
(Opt & Gring, 2009). An intervention urging members of a group to adhere to extant
group responsibility norms would be a reciprocal intervention emphasizing cooperation,
while the President of the United States issuing a directive to members of the executive
branch would be a complementary intervention emphasizing competition. Most attempts
at changing ongoing discourse can be better explained, analyzed, or planned through the
application of these intervention subsystems. However, the RSI model recognizes that
“each subsystem embodies and contains information about the other” (p. 76), leading
Brown (1987) to term them holographic, or inextricably interconnected. While RSI
analysis selects one subsystem to focus on, elements from others systems are assumed to
play simultaneously in the background.
Previous research that has employed this model has found RSI to be an effective
means of analyzing situations in which social life is impacted by rhetorical interventions.
Opt (2013, 2015), for instance, employed RSI to explore media scandals and policy
debates over mitigating sea level rise, Gring (1998) analyzed revolutionary discourse, and
Endres (2008) utilized the model to explain performance text artifacts. The key
definitional concepts of RSI, combined with its broad applicability, have provided
scholars with a singular means for interpreting a wide array of situations by utilizing
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different aspects of this model. To this end, RSI can serve as an apt mode of analysis for
rhetorical interventions that appeal to moral foundations, seek to create political
persuasion, or address polarization in American politics.
Given the complex interconnections of political communication and
psychological factors that appear to impact American political thought, RSI provides an
ideal umbrella under which to unite the insights of research on political polarization, rural
consciousness, populism, framing, social intuitionism, and MFT. By using this combined
research lens, rhetorical analysts of 21st century political interventions gain an ability to
explain not just what rhetorical shifts occurred—framing—but how people processed
those messages—social intuitionism and RSI—and why those appeals may have been so
effective or ineffective—rural consciousness and MFT. This design will yield a more
effective examination of the factors at play while also providing clearer instructions for
practitioners wishing to understand previous rhetorical interventions. With this in mind,
this thesis seeks to better understand why it is U.S. Americans have such a difficult time
communicating across political lines when discussing moral issues. Additionally, this
exploration hopes to uncover insights as to whether or not U.S. elected representatives
model best practices for political persuasion, or if the level of polarization observed in
national political discourses is driven from the bottom-up by the political communication
habits of average citizens. In other words, what can U.S. Americans learn about political
persuasion from the recommendations of communication literature and the persuasive
behavior of their elected representatives? And, does the polarized state of national
political discourses better reflect the communication behaviors of political elites or
average citizens?
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The following section describes in greater detail how the methodology was used
to analyze political discourse through a case study of the rhetorical interventions present
in the confirmation process for Betsy DeVos’ nomination to the post of Secretary of
Education.
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III. Methods
Using the Rhetoric of Social Intervention (Brown, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1987)
supplemented with additional rhetorical analyses from research on rural consciousness
(Cramer, 2016), social intuitionism (Haidt, 2001), and Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt,
2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), this study aims to explain the
nature of attempted political rhetorical interventions in the 21st century through an
examination of Democratic and Republican attempts at political persuasion in Betsy
DeVos’ confirmation as U.S. Secretary of Education in 2017. The texts analyzed include
an original transcript of the DeVos’ HELP Committee hearing, press release about
DeVos collected from Senators’ websites, and portions of the Congressional Record. The
RSI model will provide a key method and vocabulary for dissecting the attempted
interventions, as it provides a process for analyzing naming conventions, attempts to shift
attention, and conducting close analyses of rhetorical artifacts. The additional
perspectives described above will lend increased explanatory power as to the
communicative and psychological processes at play when moral persuasion is attempted.
Through this structure this study provides insights into the ways politicians symbolically
construct messages to justify proposed actions and how political cooperation is stymied
by inefficacious efforts to persuade.
This thesis will analyze Senate Democrats’ rhetorical interventions aimed at
preventing the confirmation of Betsy DeVos as Secretary of Education in the early
months of 2017 while Senate Republicans’ simultaneously attempted to normalize
DeVos’ credentials. Political discourse surrounding public education policy has become
increasingly polarized as Republicans have portrayed the Department of Education as an
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exemplar of federal overreach. This fact, combined with DeVos’ inexperience, set the
stage for a contentious rhetorical battle typified by extreme polarization and lengthy
attempts at cross-party persuasion. As DeVos was confirmed by a vote of 51-50, it is
likely that Senate Democrats were truly trying to persuade one more Republican to vote
against the nominee, making this case study a fitting series of texts to analyze and draw
conclusions about political persuasion in the United States.
Using the Rhetoric of Social Intervention, this study will examine Democrats’
primary and secondary rhetorical interventions in opposition to Betsy DeVos’ nomination
to be Secretary of Education. These interventions came in three distinct stages, each
separated because of the social system it sought to influence: first, in DeVos’ hearing
before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee; second, in
Democratic and Republican press releases about DeVos sent between the time of her
nomination and confirmation; and third, in senators’ speeches on the floor of the U.S.
Senate directly preceding the final confirmation vote. Following the pattern for RSI
analysis (see Opt & Gring, 2009), each section will begin by defining the social system in
which the interventions occurred, then describing the extant rhetoric in that space against
which the intervention is directed, before explicating the primary and secondary
interventions made by Democrats as they attempted to shift attention to name DeVos
undeserving of confirmation. In general, the competing ideologies attempted to describe
DeVos in polar opposite terms: while Republicans attempted to name DeVos mainstream
and qualified, Democrats attempted to provoke attention shifts to the alternative names of
unqualified, incompetent, and undeserving of confirmation. These “names,” which appear
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in italics throughout this text, were developed after reading all the primary texts and
identifying themes that appeared in multiple senators’ remarks.
In addition to performing an RSI analysis of each of the three stages of rhetoric in
DeVos’ confirmation process, each chapter will also compare the use of moral rhetoric by
members of both parties using a modified Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD). The
original moral foundations dictionary was created by Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009),
by generating a list of synonyms for each of the five moral foundations and then
excluding words “that seemed too distantly related to the five foundations and also words
whose primary meanings were not moral” (p. 1039). Then, this MFD was used to code
the frequency of moral rhetoric in rhetorical texts. Following the procedure used by
Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009), a “DeVos” MFD was developed that includes minor
adaptations made systematically to measure moral rhetoric in a legislative setting. As the
original MFD was written to analyze sermons, some words were not necessary for secular
analyses; additionally, some words—like “member”—were excluded because “members”
of the Senate were often identified as such with no moral intention. The full DeVos MFD
can be viewed in Appendix A.
The coding and analysis of moral rhetoric was performed using the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program, which displays the rate of moral rhetoric in
each of the five foundations as a percentage of total words spoken. LIWC can analyze the
text of any Microsoft Word document using user-generated dictionaries, which assign
words to categories, and report the frequency with which the words from each category
were used in the analyzed text (see Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010 for more on the
development and use of LIWC). Each chapter represents a different social system and
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format, so texts were chosen for analysis based on meeting criteria specific to each site of
rhetorical intervention. To qualify for LIWC analysis, speeches before the HELP
Committee had to meet three criteria: (1) they needed to be extended monologues that
proceeded questions directed to the nominee; (2) they must have addressed either DeVos’
qualifications or the nature of the confirmation process; and (3) they needed to be more
than 125 words long. Senators’ press releases that qualified for analysis in LIWC had to
meet three criteria: (1) the press release needed to be more than 125 words long; (2) the
release must have made an affective statement about DeVos; and (3) the release must
have referred only to DeVos, not DeVos and other cabinet nominees. Press releases that
included reprinted remarks of what Senators had said in the HELP Committee or on the
Senate floor were allowed to be counted, as reprinting these remarks in a press release
was intended to affect a different social system than the original speeches. Finally, Senate
floor speeches that were analyzed in LIWC needed only to mention DeVos by name;
however, only words spoken aloud by Senators on the Senate floor were analyzed. This
means that letters included for the record but not read in full were not analyzed, while
letters from constituents read aloud by Senators were analyzed. Additionally, phrases
indicative of parliamentary procedure (e.g., “I yield the floor,” etc.) were eliminated prior
to analysis. For a full list of senators whose remarks were analyzed in each section, see
Appendix B. The rhetoric analyzed in this case study came either from the daily edition
of the Congressional Record, an original transcript of the HELP Committee Hearing, or
press releases posted on senators’ official websites. In a few instances, news stories were
cited to provide context for DeVos’ remarks or to describe popular reactions to any stage
of the confirmation process.
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The next chapter describes DeVos’ testimony before the Senate HELP
Committee, beginning with a description of the social system, extant Republican names
for DeVos, then moving into Democrats’ primary and secondary interventions to rename
the nominee. In the 115th Congress of the United States, the Health, Education, Labor &
Pensions Senate Committee had 22 members: 12 Republicans and 10 Democrats. Senator
Lamar Alexander (R-TN), who served as committee chair, and ranking member Senator
Patty Murray (D-WA) were the first to speak at the committee’s hearing on the
confirmation of Elisabeth Prince “Betsy” DeVos to the US Secretary of Education (see
Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary of Education, 2017). Following opening
statements from Alexander and Murray, DeVos was introduced first by Senator Tim
Scott (R-SC), a HELP Committee member and personal friend of the DeVos family, and
former HELP Committee member ex-Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), who returned to
the Senate to speak in favor of DeVos’ confirmation. DeVos’ prepared testimony
followed, lasting roughly eight minutes, and Alexander then began a round of questions
with five minutes allotted for each Senator. In sum, the committee hearing lasted roughly
three hours and 25 minutes. Following this RSI analysis, the chapter will conclude by
comparing Democratic and Republican usage of moral rhetoric as measured by the
DeVos MFD in LIWC.
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IV. Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee Hearing
The Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions committee’s broad mandate includes
confirming nominees for Secretary of Education before the nominations head to the
Senate floor for full confirmation. Past Secretaries of Education had extensive policy
backgrounds in education, often with hands-on experience as a teacher, administrator, or
school board member, implying criteria of experience and detailed policy knowledge (see
Nomination of Betsy DeVos, 2017). Therefore, each senator’s five-minute questioning
period provides an opportunity for them to ask questions of the nominee and hear
responses. However, many Senators also used their time to register their opinions on
DeVos’ qualifications and the manner in which the hearing was organized. This structure
allowed for the creation and furtherance of multiple narratives, both for and against
DeVos’ nomination, and these narratives largely fell along party lines. While
Republicans sought to name DeVos a qualified candidate in the mainstream of public
opinion, Democrats’ interventions attempted to name DeVos unqualified, incompetent,
and unwilling to defend marginalized students. As such, this committee hearing
functioned as an arena in which partisan rhetorical interventions could struggle to best
name the relevant experiences being debated. This section explores the rhetorical
interventions employed by both Republicans and Democrats in the HELP committee
hearing using the RSI model, beginning with the primary intervention, followed by two
secondary interventions and ending with an analysis of the moral rhetoric employed in
selected statements from members of each party.
The primary intervention that occurred in the January 17, 2017 HELP Committee
hearing was the Democrats’ collective attempt to highlight gaps in DeVos’ experience
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and qualifications in the face of Republican support for the Michigan billionaire. This
intervention, which evoked the concept of loyal opposition, was rooted in the Democrats’
expectancy as the minority party to raise issues with candidates who may otherwise be
pushed through by the tyranny of a slim majority. This rhetorical stance positions their
attempts as an intervention in the power subsystem.

Table 1: A membership list of the Senate HELP Committee in January of 2017
U.S. Senator
Lamar Alexander
Johnny Isakson
Bill Cassidy, M.D.
Pat Roberts
Michael B. Enzi
Rand Paul
Todd Young
Lisa Murkowski
Richard Burr
Susan Collins
Orrin Hatch
Tim Scott
Patty Murray
Al Franken
Tammy Baldwin
Tim Kaine
Bernie Sanders
Michael F. Bennet
Christopher S. Murphy
Maggie Hassan
Robert P. Casey
Sheldon Whitehouse
Elizabeth Warren

Party
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

State
TN
GA
LA
KS
WY
KY
IN
AK
NC
ME
UT
SC
WA
MN
WI
VA
VT
CO
CT
NH
PA
RI
MA
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Social System
The HELP Committee hearing was the first step of DeVos’ legislative approval
process, and the persuasive arguments being made at this stage of the confirmation
process were largely still focused on members of Congress and the incoming Trump
administration. Senate Republicans functioned as the primary power-holders in this social
system, as their majority meant they had little need to work with the minority party.
However, with a 51-seat majority, the slim supremacy of Senate Republicans also
elevated the importance of the minority Democrats; after all, if Democrats could persuade
one or two Republicans to doubt DeVos’ qualifications, DeVos’ nomination could be
derailed. The very real possibility that Democrats could prevent this nominee from being
confirmed makes the rhetoric employed by both parties in this space worthy of analysis,
as it seems likely that Democrats’ persuasive efforts were truly aimed at changing
Republicans’ minds. HELP Committee Chairman Lamar Alexander’s description of the
committee shortly after gaveling the hearing to order indicated that this committee had, in
fact, been open to working together across party lines, emphasizing a power-sharing
system organized cooperatively:
Uh, this is the committee, as it’ll probably become evident as we go along, that
has some considerable differences of opinion on a variety of issues. But, we have
found that we can sometimes resolve them in important ways. Last year, we
passed what the Majority Leader, Senator McConnell, said was the most
important bill of the Congress—21st Century Cures—and the year before a bill
fixing No Child Left Behind which President Obama called a Christmas miracle
plus 33 other bills signed by the president—33 total. I want to thank Senator
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Murray and the Democrats as well as the Republicans on the committee for
operating in that fashion. We’ve done that by showing courtesy to ourselves and
to our witnesses which I hope will be evident today. (Nomination of Betsy DeVos
to serve as Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 1)
Members of both the majority and minority described the committee as a non-partisan,
cooperative body with a deep interest in the subjects under their purview, positioning the
Senators present as not only elected representatives but policy experts whose standards
should transcend partisanship. For instance, Ranking Member Patty Murray (D-WA)
invoked her credentials as a “former pre-school teacher and school board member, as
well as a mom who got her start in politics fighting for public investments in early
learning” (p. 4), and Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA) and Maggie Hassan (D-NH) alluded to
their families’ personal struggles with learning and physical disabilities. Because of the
HELP committee’s reputation of being above the political fray and being focused instead
on experience and responsible governance, it seems even more likely that persuasion
could be a possible outcome of these Senators’ discussions. Given these senators’
credentials, it seems likely that the HELP Committee members were the best situated to
send cues as political elites to the rest of the country about how they should feel about
DeVos.
Though the Senators on the committee are certainly the primary power-sharers in
this social system, outside influences still had some impact on the conversations taking
place. DeVos is a member of this HELP Committee social system, as her record was up
for debate and she had a chance to defend her past actions. One Republican defense for
keeping the hearing brief, as Alexander suggested, was to “defer to the president… [as] it
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was important to have a secretary in place” (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as
Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 56), meaning President Trump had a direct influence on
the committee’s discussion, though he was not a respondent to claims made for or against
DeVos during the hearing. Though the hearing was televised on C-SPAN and through
internet streaming options, few, if any, acknowledgements were made to the audience
watching at home, and the influence of outside groups and constituents was represented
primarily through the letters of support or disapproval that Senators added to the
hearing’s record. With this social system clearly identified, analysis of the Democrats’
attention intervention against Republicans’ attempts to characterize DeVos as
mainstream and qualified focuses on the players in the room as they attempted to
persuade each other.
Republican naming: Mainstream and qualified
Alexander’s opening statement served as Republicans’ first attempt to name
DeVos as a qualified, mainstream nominee. This naming, which was likely a response to
the outcry over DeVos’ nomination, was central to Alexander’s thesis: “I believe [DeVos
is] in the mainstream of public opinion and her critics are not” (p. 2). His argument,
which was clearly previewed and commenced in an orderly, coherent fashion, sought to
refute the three main arguments he had heard against DeVos; each main point ended with
the refrain “she’s in the mainstream, she’s on the side of our children” (p. 3). Alexander’s
ability to frame the conversation was a key advantage for Republicans, as his opening
remarks contained messages that foregrounded DeVos’ experience, philanthropy, and
bipartisan support for charter schools, while backgrounding concerns about the
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nominee’s partisanship that Democrats would later raise. Alexander concluded his
remarks:
The final criticism is that she’s used her wealth to support these ideas; I think she
deserves credit for that. Would the critics be happier if she had spent her time and
her money trying to deny children more choices of schools that wealthy families
already have? We’re fortunate that Betsy DeVos is the nominee for U.S.
Education Secretary. She is and has been on our children’s side. (p. 3)
By naming DeVos as mainstream, characterizing her lifetime of political activity as
qualifications that demonstrate her student-centered agenda, and invoking his past
service as Secretary of Education under President George H. W. Bush, Alexander set a
precedent for Republican support of DeVos’ confirmation that was based on a seemingly
logical, comprehensive rationale endorsed by a policy expert.
Before the round of questions began, the Republican case for DeVos was further
promoted by introductions of the nominee from Scott, Lieberman, and DeVos herself.
Scott (R-SC), a friend of the DeVos family and sitting member of the HELP Committee,
introduced DeVos by naming her a “champion of education for poor kids” (p. 7) before
providing a biography for DeVos and her husband. As Scott told it, the billionaire DeVos
“had a humble beginning” (p. 8) and started working at her parents’ shop when she was
seven years old. Additionally, “Betsy worked the third shift at her family’s business” (p.
8) when she was off from college, which Scott said meant “she understands the sacrifices
that families have to make in order to build a better life for themselves and for their
children” (p. 8); in short, DeVos understands and believes in the American dream. Scott’s
foregrounding of select anecdotes from DeVos’ formative years represented the most
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direct attempt to argue the nominee was a “normal person,” rather than a rich heiress
insulated from the problems an average U.S. American family faced. Lieberman’s
introduction went beyond the personal and related his experience of working with
DeVos’ American Federation for Children (AFC), which he stated had helped nearly half
a million low-income students receive better educations. Lieberman, who was Vice
President Al Gore’s running mate on the 2000 Democratic presidential ticket, lent his
credibility to DeVos by describing her thusly: “She is disciplined, organized, knows how
to set goals, and then develop practical plans to achieve them. She is really a purposedriven team builder, and I’ve seen that in my membership on the board of the AFC” (p.
9). As a respected, bipartisan voice, Lieberman’s endorsement attempted to reassure
Democrats who were concerned about DeVos’ lack of experience that she was
temperamentally fit for the job.
Lieberman’s introduction also attempted to shift attention away from gaps in the
Republican narrative of DeVos as mainstream and qualified in two key ways. First,
Lieberman addressed what Senator Warren would later describe as DeVos’ “lack of
experience” (p. 41), by explaining that the post of Education Secretary is so vast that no
one could ever be completely prepared to lead it.
Now I understand that the Department of Education is bigger than anything she
or, for that matter, any of us—except for Senator Alexander, of course—has ever
led. But, everything I have seen tells me that Betsy is ready to take on this
assignment and do it very well. I know that some people are questioning her
qualifications to be Secretary of Education, and too many of those questions to me
seem to be based on the fact that she doesn’t come from within the education
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establishment. But, honest, I believe that today that’s one of the most important
qualifications you could have for this job. (p. 9)
Rather than shying away from characterizations of DeVos as unqualified, Lieberman
used his introduction and bi-partisan appeal to turn the nominee’s greatest weakness—her
lack of experience—into a virtue—being an anti-establishment, successful capitalist who
knows how to get the job done. Lieberman furthers this naming of experience by
explaining away the outpouring of public disapproval for DeVos’ nomination as being a
result of her “fighting for reform and disrupting the status quo for so long” (p. 10) which
made her confirmation process “naturally controversial” (p. 10). This assertion, though
stated in a reasonable-sounding tone, is actually a loaded statement masking attention as
it dismisses concerns about DeVos as par-for-the-course when dealing with a qualified
candidate. He also added, “In all my work with her I have never heard Betsy speak
against our public school system.” As a retired U.S. Senator who had previously served
on the HELP committee and with his positionality as a former Democrat-turnedIndependent now supporting the Education Secretary nominee of a Republican president,
Lieberman’s credible support contributed to the otherwise Republican narrative that
DeVos is a mainstream, qualified nominee for such a position and, therefore, deserving of
confirmation.
The last person to defend the nominee’s record and qualifications before the
question round began was DeVos herself. Her opening remarks, which barely deviated
from her publicly-released prepared marks, made a case for her nomination and portrayed
her views as centrist and sensible. After introducing her family members and supporters
who were present in the gallery, DeVos asserted her commitment to “bring educational
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opportunity to every family in this great nation” (p. 10) and affirmed that “learning as a
lifelong pursuit is a fundamental American virtue” (p. 10), thereby appealing to a
mainstream value. Building on Scott’s characterization of her early years as working
class, DeVos shared a story about one of the key influences of her early life.
Growing up in Holland, Michigan, I attended local Christian schools and then
Calvin College. My greatest educational influence in life was a public school
teacher named Elsa Prince. While her students called her Mrs. Prince, to this day,
I just call her “mom.” When Dick and I became parents, education took on a
whole new meaning. We recognized that other parents were not able to make
similar decisions about their children’s education, based on their income or the
zip code in which they lived. (p. 11)
While this narrative did nothing to increase her perceived leadership experience with
public schools, mentioning her Christian background and reverence for her mother’s
vocation helped foreground her own story as a relatable, caring citizen who feels good
will toward public educators and background her reputation as a billionaire Republican
donor. After other remarks about her advocacy for charter schools in Michigan and nods
toward traditional Republican talking points—such as “President-elect Trump and I know
it won’t be Washington, D.C. that unlocks our nation’s potential… the answer is local
control” (p. 12) and “craftsmanship is not a fallback, but a noble pursuit” (p. 12)—DeVos
delivered a strong closing summary of her reason for seeking confirmation; namely, that
she cares about children.
For nearly three decades, I’ve been involved in education, as a volunteer, an
advocate for children, and a voice for parents. I’ve worked as an in-school mentor
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for students in the Grand Rapids Public Schools, and have had the privilege of
interacting with students and their families and teachers in ways that have
changed my life and my perspective about education forever. I’ve worked with
governors, legislators, and business and community leaders to expand educational
opportunity through options that are making a lifetime of difference for hundreds
of thousands of kids this year alone. And, I’ve worked with many dedicated
teachers who strive every day to help students achieve, fulfill their potential, and
prepare them for the global challenges that they will face. For me, it’s simple: I
trust parents, and I believe in our children. (p. 12)
This statement, which foregrounds DeVos’ relevant experience and demonstrates ample
rhetorical deference to the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity moral foundations, may
have been a strong finish for the nominee’s self-defense, but it did nothing to address the
overwhelmingly negative reviews her nomination had been getting. Still, Senator Susan
Collins (R-ME) later indicated her disagreement with how Democrats were
characterizing DeVos, stating, “Given your lifelong work and commitment to education,
any suggestion, such as was made earlier, that your nomination is linked to your political
contributions is really unfair and unwarranted” (p. 43). This remark is particularly
noteworthy as Collins later became one of two Republicans to vote against DeVos’
confirmation in the full Senate. In these statements, and in their later questions to the
nominee, Republicans gave DeVos the opportunity to foreground only her relevant
experiences while backgrounding any anomalies—such as her lack of government
experience—that may have weakened their narrative.
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Primary Intervention: Democrats say DeVos is not “mainstream” or “qualified”
The primary intervention in this rhetorical discourse came from Democrats who,
through their ranking member’s opening statement and individual question periods, railed
against the Republicans’ attempt to background DeVos’ demonstrable lack of
qualifications for the post to which she was nominated. This intervention was performed
both because DeVos’ ideas clashed with Democrats’ ideologies but also because DeVos’
inexperience, in Democrats’ eyes, rendered her unfit for office; in essence, their
resistance was both ideological and institutional. While differences in ideology often lead
to attempts at shifting attention—as ideologies are superordinate systems of names that
are, by their nature, incomplete (see Brown, 1978)—the role-based opposition Democrats
levied as the minority party on the committee places their attempt to shift attention as an
intervention within the power subsystem. The United States’ two party system is
predicated, in part, on power sharing and interdependency as a means of democratically
representing the needs of all constituencies. This is reflected in the U.S. Senate’s
committee structure, which gives committee leadership and a slim majority to the party
that holds control of the chamber. By positioning themselves as competitive power
holders rather than cooperative power subjects, Democrats intervened in the
Republicans’ ongoing attempt to name DeVos’ experiences and qualifications from a
position of strength rather than subservience. As such, Democrats’ intervention seems
aimed at enacting whatever sanctions they are able to as the minority party to encourage
an additional Republican defector to oppose DeVos’ confirmation.
Following Alexander’s initial pre-emptive defense of DeVos’ nomination, Murray
gave her opening remarks as ranking member of the minority and used her time to raise
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concerns with DeVos’ nomination without becoming overtly hostile. It is worth noting
that, as DeVos’ nomination moved forward in the weeks following the HELP committee
hearing, Murray’s tone became increasingly combative and explicit. The tone of her
opening remarks, then, is the first indication that Democrats’ HELP committee
intervention was not mere political brinksmanship or opposition, but rather loyal
opposition wherein each party’s nominees are given a fair hearing even if ideological
differences exist. As Murray articulated at the top of her opening remarks:
This is the first of many hearings that we will be holding on President-Elect
Trump’s nominees to fill critical positions in the federal government, so I want to
start by reiterating the importance of the Senate’s role in this process and this
committee’s role in this Senate work. President Trump has the right to [stutter] fill
his cabinet with people he thinks will fill out the vision for [stutter] our country,
but that doesn’t mean that the Senate should be a rubber stamp. To the contrary,
we owe it the people we represent to make sure that every nominee is not only
qualified for the position and free of conflicts of interest, but that he or she will
put families and workers first, and not millionaires, billionaires, or big
corporations. (p. 4)
By foregrounding the responsibility of Democrats, as the minority party, to dutifully
check the actions of the majority, Murray established the first of many allusions to a selfname of loyal opposition for Democrats. Murray furthered this sentiment with specific
focus on the Secretary of Education position, saying “leading this agency is a big job. It is
an important job, and I consider it to be my job to do everything I can to make sure
whoever fills it is truly committed to putting students and families first” (p. 5). By
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foregrounding the responsibility of the minority party to vet the candidates put forward
by the majority party, Murray emphasizes the Democrats’ power and responsibility on
the committee rather than simply trying to shift attention to anomalies in the
Republicans’ naming system.
Murray did use the second half of her opening remarks to articulate concerns with
DeVos’ record or, more accurately, the lack of said record. Murray articulated four
primary concerns with DeVos’ nomination that she hoped would be addressed during the
hearing: needing more information about DeVos’ “extensive financial entanglements and
potential conflicts of interest … which are made in ways that are not transparent” (p. 5);
second, having “major concerns about how you spent your career and fortune fighting to
privatize public education and gut investments in public schools;” third, gaining insight
to DeVos’ policy positions, which remain “not clear on a number of issues;” and fourth,
clarifying DeVos’ beliefs on Title IX and the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights. Murray’s opening remarks set a tone for the Democrats’ questioning of DeVos in
that many of these issues were rearticulated by other Democratic Senators.
The first major question that highlighted the anomalies in DeVos’ record that
defied expectations for an Education Secretary nominee (which Republicans were
backgrounding) came from Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), who narrowly lost the
Democratic presidential nomination to Hillary Clinton in 2016. After voicing his
concerns that the United States was fast becoming an oligarchy, Sanders inquired about
the amount of money the DeVos family had contributed to the Republican Party over the
years. After establishing that the number could well be as high as $200 million, Sanders
and DeVos had the following interchange:
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Sanders: My question is, and I don’t mean to be rude, but do you think that if you
were not a multi-billionaire, if your family has not made hundreds of millions of
dollars of contributions to the Republican party, that you would be sitting here
today?
DeVos: Um, Senator, as a matter of fact, I do think that there would be that
possibility. I’ve worked very hard on behalf of parents and children for the last
almost 30 years to be a voice for parents [stutter] a voice for students and to
empower parents to make decisions on behalf of their children, primarily lowincome children. (p. 18)
By foregrounding the political nature of DeVos’ advocacy, Sanders drew attention to the
interconnectedness between her enormous wealth and her life’s work. While DeVos has
been involved in education advocacy for almost 30 years, her efforts were made possible
by her and her husband’s large fortune. Though Sanders moved on from this line of
questioning immediately after DeVos’ response, his pointed question made headlines
(see, e.g., Strauss, 2017) and, in not responding to her answer, rhetorically made DeVos’
work, wealth, and Republican political support inseparable. Sanders implicitly renamed
DeVos’ educational advocacy as partisan political activity and DeVos herself, by her
failure to recognize the privileges afforded her because of her enormous wealth, as an
out-of-touch billionaire. Rather than explicitly attacking her inexperience, Sanders’
decision to let the nominee’s established lack of credentials go unmentioned served to
solidify unqualified as a name that, without question, applied to DeVos. This out-of-touch
billionaire name also functioned to split DeVos’ lack of qualifications into two
categories: professional and personal. Not only did Sanders implicitly invalidate her
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professional work experiences, this question also implied DeVos lacked the personal
character and temperament to hold office as she was unable to recognize the influence of
her own wealthy background.
Later in the committee hearing, a few newsworthy gaffes reinforced this out-oftouch billionaire name. Most noteworthy, perhaps, was DeVos’ suggestion that a school
in Wapiti, Wyoming needed to keep a gun on premises “to protect from potential
grizzlies” (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 39);
the school quickly confirmed that no such weaponry was necessary (see Alsup, 2017).
More telling, however, was DeVos’ response to Senator Tammy Baldwin’s (D-WI)
question about how the nominee planned to support lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender
and queer (LGBTQ) students. This was tense in light of the DeVos family’s past support
for a gay conversion therapy program and the fact that Baldwin is the Senate’s first
openly-lesbian representative. After repeating a line she had used previously—“Let me
restate again I embrace equality, and I firmly believe in the intrinsic value of each
individual” (p. 36)—DeVos attempted to use her credibility as a mother to express her
support for LGBTQ students: “I, if I had-- as a mom, I just can't imagine having a child
that would feel discriminated against for any reason, and I would want my child in a safe
environment” (p. 36). Though intended as support for her own qualifications, DeVos’
admission that she “just can’t imagine having a child that would feel discriminated
against” (p. 36) highlighted the Democrats’ concerns about her dearth of experience with
public schools. Not only was DeVos professionally unqualified, her personal
qualifications came from such a privileged position that she could not empathize with atrisk student populations, also implying she may not be aware of other issues pertaining to
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the Department of Education. Sanders’ establishment of the out-of-touch billionaire name
allowed for subsequent DeVos gaffes to be perceived not only as gaffes, but as
indications of personal incapacity to serve as Secretary of Education.
The next major support for the Democrats’ intervention against DeVos’
nomination came when Senator Franken asked the nominee to propound her beliefs on
the relative virtues of measuring student progress by proficiency or growth standards.
The exchange, which came at the top of Franken’s five-minute question period, “caused a
lot of brouhaha on social media and has been covered extensively by the news media”
(Wong, 2017, para. 8) and led Franken to later remark that DeVos was the “least
qualified nominee I’d ever seen” (State of the Union, 2017).
Franken: And this brings me to the issue of proficiency, which the senator cited,
versus growth. I would like your views on the relative advantage of profi—
measuring, doing assessments and using them to measure proficiency or growth.
DeVos: Thank you Senator, for that question. I think if I am understanding your
question correctly around proficiency, I would also correlate it to competency and
mastery, so that you each student is measured according to the advancement that
they are making in each subject area.
Franken: That's growth. That's not proficiency. … it surprises me that you don't
know this issue… well, I’m not that surprised that you did not know this issue.
(Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 24-25)
This interchange proved consequential in news coverage surrounding the HELP
Committee hearing and became one of the single most prominent pieces of evidence to
confirm DeVos was unqualified and an out-of-touch billionaire. Franken’s method of
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asking this question, however, is noteworthy in that it did not explicitly confront DeVos
on her lack of qualifications; rather, Franken foregrounded the importance of identifying
basic terminology and concepts within the field by asking a “wonky-sounding prompt
that could’ve easily caused many viewers to tune out” (Wong, 2017, para. 5). It was not
until DeVos failed to correctly identify the two standards for measuring student learning
that Franken’s tone became incredulous and condescending. This tonal shift, however,
did not change into a direct berating of the nominee—with the possible exception of
“well, I’m not that surprised” (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary of
Education, 2017, p. 25)—as the Senator then shifted into a discussion of DeVos’ past
support for gay conversion therapy. By staying focused on testing the nominee’s
competency rather than continuing to bash her for her “proficiency vs. growth” blunder,
Franken furthered the Democrats’ attempted intervention by upholding his party’s loyal
opposition name. Near the end of his questioning period, Franken also gave DeVos a
chance to clarify a statistic she had cited during Senator Hatch’s (R-UT) question about
student loan debt. Specifically, DeVos had stated that student loan debt had gone “up
almost 1000% in the last eight years” (p. 21).
Franken: In terms of throwing numbers around, you say student debt has
increased by 1000%.
DeVos: 980% in eight years.
Franken: I’m sorry?
DeVos: 980%.
Franken: That's just not so. It has increased 118% in the past eight years. I'm just
asking, if you are challenging my figures, I would ask that you get your figures
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straight about education policy. That's why we want more questions, because we
want to know if this person that we are entrusting, may entrust, to be the secretary
of education, if she has the breadth and depth of knowledge that we would expect
from someone who has that important uh that important job. (p. 26)
Franken was correct about the student loan debt statistic (see Berman, 2017), adding
credibility to Democrats’ portrayal of DeVos as incompetent. Twice in his five-minute
question period, Franken gave DeVos just enough rope, so to speak, to demonstrate her
incompetence through unforced errors rather than resorting to attacks that could be
criticized as partisan or opportunistic. Franken’s questions were key elements of the
Democrats’ attention intervention and also served to highlight the anomalies in DeVos’
record that Republicans had backgrounded in their support of the nominee.
Next, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)—a former lawyer and professor of law
at Harvard University—interrogated DeVos on what Warren termed the nominee’s
“qualifications for leading the nation on higher education” (Nomination of Betsy DeVos
to serve as Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 41) since her lack of experience with K-12
education had already been demonstrated. For the duration of this question period,
Warren projected a persona that was part prosecutor interviewing a witness and part
professor shutting down a disruptive student. This style, which contrasted with other
senators’ less confrontational demeanors, garnered significant news and social media
attention; for instance, a five-and-a-half minute-long YouTube video uploaded by an
organization screen-named Reflect (2017) titled “Elizabeth Warren Destroys Betsy
DeVos At Confirmation Hearing” received more than 1.5 million views, and Google
Trends reported the search term “elizabeth warren devos” went from zero usage to peak
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popularity in the 48 hours following the hearing. Given Warren’s paralingual and
rhetorical choices, this five-minute question period seemed designed to demonstrate
“logical” proof that DeVos had literally no relevant experience to qualify her to become
Secretary of Education. Chairman Alexander later criticized Warren’s rhetorical
maneuvering by saying, “Lewis Carroll [the author of Alice in Wonderland] would be
proud of that kind of reasoning” (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary of
Education, 2017, p. 56), implying Warren’s logic was ludicrous. The exchange sought to
direct attention to both DeVos’ personal and professional lack of experience with public
schools or school loan programs, as well as her noncommittal attitude toward ensuring
transparency and accountability. Despite the increasing specificity of Warren’s questions,
DeVos failed to provide a satisfactorily-detailed answer. Though she promised to be
“vigilant” (p. 42) DeVos was unable to demonstrate how she would oversee the
responsible allocation of federal dollars. After repeated follow up questions that yielded
more non-specific replies from the nominee, Warren summarized her dissatisfaction with
DeVos’ answers on accountability in a memorable fashion.
You know, swindlers and crooks are out there doing back flips when they hear an
answer like this. If confirmed, you will be the cop on the beat. And if you can’t
commit to use the tools that are already available to you in the Department of
Education, then I don't see how you could be the Secretary of Education. (p. 43)
Warren’s anomaly-featuring communication highlighted not just DeVos’
inexperience but her evasiveness when asked direct questions. Though DeVos’ smile
never wavered, this facial expression seemed more artificial than sincere as she failed to
provide direct answers to questions. A similar series of responses from DeVos during
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questioning from Senator Kaine (D-VA)—a former Democratic vice-presidential
candidate, governor, mayor, and lawyer—helped concretize naming the nominee as
evasive or insincere. As DeVos (once again) failed to provide a detailed answer, the
tension in the room and Kaine’s frustration became increasingly apparent.
Kaine: And, if confirmed, will you insist on that equal accountability in any K-12
school or educational program that receives federal funding, whether public,
public-charter, or private?
DeVos: I support accountability.
Kaine: Equal accountability for all schools that receive federal funding?
DeVos: I support accountability.
Kaine: K., is that a yes or a no?
DeVos: That’s uh—I support accountability.
Kaine: Do you not want to answer my question?
DeVos: I support accountability.
Kaine: Ok, let me ask you this: I think all schools that receive taxpayer funding
should be equally accountable. Do you agree with me or not?
DeVos: Well, they don’t—they’re not, today.
Kaine: But I think they should. Do you agree with me or not?
DeVos: Well, no, because—
Kaine: You don’t agree with me. (p. 49)
Despite being given six separate opportunities in this interchange to give a convincing
answer, DeVos’ repetitive responses instead contributed to a perception that she was
hiding something; why else would she fail to convince the senator of her commitment?
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The parallel effects of Warren and Kaine’s rhetoric proved to be the HELP Committee
hearing’s most aggressively interrogative portions and, though these rhetorical tactics
may have aimed to support the perception of the Democrats as loyal opposition, the
senators’ apparent “condescension” led Trump administration spokesperson Kellyanne
Conway to accuse Democrats of “humiliating and trying to embarrass” DeVos (Conway,
2017, para. 1). Though these tactics energized Democratic loyalists against DeVos they
created an easy target for Trump and DeVos supporters to criticize, suggesting Warren
and Kaine were more interested in sending messages to their base than actually trying to
persuade their Republican colleagues. This message orientation suggests that, as a result,
these question periods may not have targeted a part of the defined social system of this
hearing, though it may also indicate the two senators hoped that public outrage would
have a greater impact on their Republican colleagues than face-to-face attempts at
persuasion.
Beyond prompting DeVos’ uncomfortable responses about supporting
accountability, Kaine also used his portion of the hearing to drill DeVos about her
support for students with physical and mental disabilities. By using his questions as a
means of testing the nominee on her knowledge of and support for federal laws that
protect students with disabilities, Kaine positioned himself as an advocate for students
with disabilities while also giving DeVos an opportunity to express her knowledge on the
matter. As was the case with previous questions, however, DeVos failed to adequately
answer the question. The inquiry that prompted news media to report extensively on
DeVos’ confusion about the function of federal laws (see, e.g., Strauss, 2017) began with
a simple question from Kaine:
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Kaine: Should all K-12 schools receiving governmental funding be required to
meet the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?
DeVos: I think they already are.
Kaine: K., so, but I’m asking you a ‘should’ question; whether they are or not,
we’ll get into that later. Should all schools that receive taxpayer funding be
required to meet the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education?
DeVos: I think that is a matter better left to the states.
Kaine: So, state’s might—some states might be good to kids with disabilities, and
other state might not be so good, and then what? People can move around the
country if they don’t like how their kids are being treated?
DeVos: I think that is an issue best left to the states.
Kaine: What about the federal requirement? It’s a federal law, the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act. (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as
Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 49-50)
Shockingly, DeVos had failed to recognize that IDEA—a landmark civil rights and
education policy milestone—was a federal law. Noting DeVos’ evasive answers on
IDEA, Kaine concluded his question time by noting, “It’s not a court, you’re not under
oath, not under subpoena, but you’re trying to win my vote” (p. 50), leaving the social
system at play to wonder why, exactly, DeVos was unwilling to commit to enforcing this
federal law. In other words, DeVos failed to meet the expectancies Democrats had for an
Education Secretary nominee during a confirmation hearing. The final blow to DeVos’
credibility, which cemented her names of evasive and unqualified, came when Senator
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Hassan (D-NH), a newly-elected senator and former governor whose son has cerebral
palsy, followed up on the nominee’s responses to Kaine’s simple question.
Hassan: I want to go back to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act.
That is a federal civil rights law. So, do you stand by your statement a few
minutes ago that it should be up to the states whether to follow it?
DeVos: Federal law must be followed where federal dollars are in play.
Hassan: So, were you unaware what I just asked you about, the IDEA, that it is a
federal law?
DeVos: I may have confused it.
Hassan: … I just would urge you to become familiar, should you be nominated,
with the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act and, I do have to say, I'm
concerned that you seem so unfamiliar with it, and you seem to support vouchers
schools that have not honored, you know, have made students sign away their
rights to make sure the law is enforced. That is very troubling to me.
DeVos: Senator, I assure you that if confirmed, I will be very sensitive to the
needs of special needs students and the policies surrounding that.
Hassan: And, with all due respect, it’s not about sensitivity—although that helps.
It is about being willing to enforce the law to make sure that my child and every
child has the same access to public education—high-quality public education. (p.
58)
Hassan’s follow up to Kaine’s questioning yielded DeVos’ self-admitted ignorance
regarding a key federal law that impacts the nation’s students and concretized the
Democrats’ loyal opposition competitive power intervention by emphasizing the
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importance of experience and knowledge without directly berating the nominee or
accusing her of incompetence. The Democrats’ anomaly-featuring communication was
made more effective because the anomalies it revealed in Republicans’ anomaly-masking
communication (mainstream and qualified) came not from the questioning senators but
from the nominee’s failure to correctly answer simple questions about education policy.
Though each individual senator attempted to provoke attention shifts with their
anomaly-featuring communication, the sum of their efforts contributed to the Democrats’
competitive power intervention and the power-share code between minority and majority
party elected officials it evoked. The Democrats’ questioning highlighted DeVos’
inexperience as well as potential problematic conflicts of interest, all of which was
backgrounded in the Republicans’ anomaly-masking communication leveraged in support
of Trump’s nominee. Republican support for DeVos may have been implicitly defended
under the superordinate ideological name capitalist success story; DeVos, as a billionaire
in a free-market capitalist society that rewards good ideas with profit, is assumed to have
some inherent value. If she was not inherently competent, it would be impossible for her
to be a capitalist success story under this ideological system. By consistently affording
DeVos the opportunity to demonstrate her own incompetence through unforced errors,
Democrats suggest that her success is better explained by being a too-big-to-fail
billionaire; rather than ascribing her great wealth to her success as a business woman, this
explanation highlights the central nature of the nominee’s inexhaustible funds to every
part of her “experience.” The total effect of Democrats’ questioning may have been to
name DeVos a white mediocrity though, as an op-ed in Ebony pointed out, “I can’t even
accuse DeVos of being mediocre, because mediocrity would at least imply there was

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

67

some effort involved. Her deluded responses were complemented with a smug smile that
elicited to viewers that she [thought she] belonged” (Chappell, 2017).
Secondary Interventions: The Golden Rule and Charter School Accountability
Even as the primary intervention played out through attempted attention switches
from both Democrats and Republicans, two secondary interventions were also happening.
As Opt (2017) points out, naming is a fundamental human activity and, “in naming
experience, human beings constitute a symbolic “reality,” which, as an abstraction, is
necessarily incomplete” (p. 2). The RSI approach theorizes that for multiple interventions
and attempts to provoke attention switches to take place simultaneously; there are always
gaps in symbolic “reality” to be explained. The distinction between primary and
secondary interventions, as well as which actors are performing the primary or secondary
intervention depends on what the researcher chooses to background and foreground in the
analysis. The first secondary intervention comes from Alexander’s implementation of the
“Golden Rule,” and the second comes from the Democrats’ attempt to rename “charter
schools” as unaccountable.
The first is a competitive power intervention enacted by Chairman Alexander
through the implementation of sanctions, or the imposition of conditions by a powerholder for violating power code or the rules of the relationship (see Opt & Gring, 2009).
In the case of the HELP Committee, a taken for granted rule is that the minority party is
subservient to the majority party’s desires or authority. Alexander’s strict adherence to
having only one five-minute round of questions during DeVos’ hearing can be considered
a “rule” because it demonstrates—with clarity—that Alexander holds the most power in
the room. This “rule”—and the threat of sanctions should it be violated—is meant to
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support Alexander’s “Golden Rule” explanation for limiting the questions to only one
round, in which he names his decision fair and demonstrating parity with how President
Obama’s nominees were treated as opposed to partisan or non-transparent. Not only
does the implementation of a sanction imply a clear majority rules power code, it may
also confer a sense of authority and legitimacy to the power-holder; Alexander’s stature
and reputation would be maintained or heightened by his strict, seemingly-fair discharge
of power. Though Democrats certainly attempted to change Alexander’s mind, his
stubbornness warrants being considered the main intervention because it was this
symbolically-constituted reality that carried the day (at least on paper). This section will
analyze Alexander’s power intervention through sanctions as well as the Republican and
Democratic attempts to rename the decision to hold only one round of questions for
DeVos.
The second secondary intervention that permeated the HELP Committee hearing
comes from Democrats’ attempts to rename “charter schools” as unaccountable or
undeserving of federal funds. According to a traditionally conservative or libertarian
ideology, the way to create a “perfect” education system is through “charter schools.”
Ideologies, as superordinate rhetorical constructions, create powerful expectancies as to
how the world should work; violations of these expectancies are not only problems that
affect immediate perception but also the larger rhetorical implications for the relevant
ideology. As such, the struggle between Democrats and Republicans to name the nature
of “charter schools” is a struggle that transcends Betsy DeVos or even the Trump
Administration, but is also intricately tied with perceptions of DeVos’ qualifications for
serving as Secretary of Education. This section will examine the unsuccessful attempt by
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Democrats to persuade Republicans that charter schools are unaccountable and
underserving of federal funds and, as a result, that DeVos’ “experience” wasn’t relevant.
Alexander’s “Golden Rule.” Alexander’s stubborn refusal to consider a secondround of questions for DeVos’ hearing, combined with the hearing taking place after
business hours, represented a major power intervention that conflicted with the
chairman’s reputation as one of the “fairest” politicians in Washington, D.C. Throughout
the hearing, numerous Democrats expressed their displeasure with Alexander’s decision
to limit DeVos’ questioning and some even noted that this implementation of sanctions
was out of character, thereby violating the expectancy set by his “fair” name. Senator
Bennet (D-CO), the former superintendent of the Denver Public Schools, called
Alexander “one of the fairest people in this town” (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve
as Secretary of Education, 2017, p. 54) and said “it pained” him to voice his discontent
over the chairman’s decision “in view of how fair [Alexander had] been to me and other
members” (p. 28), and Senator Whitehouse (D-RI) said he was “very fond of
[Alexander], and… very fond of this committee” (p. 33) but he didn’t believe the
chairman’s decision was accurately representative of Senate precedent. To dissect
Alexander’s power intervention, this section will begin by describing his initial “Golden
Rule” justification for the hearing’s agenda, continue by analyzing Democratic attempts
to name that decision, and conclude by elucidating the rhetorical implications of
Alexander’s refusal to change course.
Alexander used a Christian biblical reference—an allusion to the “Golden
Rule”—and a stated desire to be fair and non-partisan to justify his refusal to allow more
than one round of questions. As a former secretary of education with a reputation for
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fairness, Alexander seemed keen to build his ethos by foregrounding fairness and parity
in his design of the hearing’s process. Before he even began his opening remarks,
Alexander said:
We’re going to apply what I would call the Golden Rule, the one that comes from
the book of Matthew, which applies the same procedures to you that we used in
2001 and 2005 for President George W. Bush’s education secretary nominees and
in 2009 and 2016 for President Obama’s education secretary nominees, so we’ll
consider you and then vote just as we did then. (p. 1)
The previous hearings that Alexander enumerated were thereafter considered and named
precedent in his argument, and he regarded precedent as the ultimate support material for
a fair, logical rationale for limiting questions. In addition, his extreme foregrounding of a
biblical allusion and a specific reference to a book of the new testament is clearly
intended to activate a Judeo-Christian moral ethic while also painting him as a religious
man. If Alexander believed, as appears to be the case, that religion is an ideological
concept that implies moral superiority, honesty, fairness, and being above the fray of
politics, then foregrounding his religious background was also an ethical appeal intended
to improve the audience’s estimation of his credibility.
When he was challenged about his decision by Democrats multiple times,
Alexander usually returned to a variation on his initial refrain. For instance, when Senator
Murray raised concerns about moving ahead with so few questions when DeVos had not
completed her necessary ethics and financial disclosures, the chairman extended his
“Golden Rule” metaphor to imply his reasoning was also non-partisan and historically
consistent.
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I’m gonna follow the Golden Rule. I’m not going to change the rules that apply to
Senator [stutter] to uh Mrs. DeVos to rules that we haven’t applied to President
Obama’s nominees or to President Bush’s nominees, so we’ll have a five minute
round of questions and, uh, you and I can ask questions after that for another five
minutes. That’s exactly what we’ve done before… I would note that committee
rules don’t require tax returns to be reported by uh presidential nominees, the law
does not, we did not require it of President Obama’s two nominees for education
secretary. If we want to change the rules, we can do that, but I’m not in favor of
changing the rules in the middle of a... in the middle of the process. (p. 6)
He reiterated that idea, that the committee should not change course in the “middle” of a
process, a moment later, saying:
Alexander: Well, I appreciate the request but I’m not going to change the rules in
the middle of the game.
Murray: I was not aware those were rules.
Alexander: That-that is the precedent that we followed as far back as 1991 when I
was the Education Secretary. We did it for both of President Obama’s and we’re
going to the same thing for Mrs. DeVos. (p. 7)
Alexander went one step further in a response to comments from Senator Al Franken (DMN), effectively naming his decision to limit questioning preventing partisanship. The
chairman replied to Franken, “We are not going to treat a Republican nominee different
than we treated Democratic nominee. We’ve had the same situation with both of
President Obama’s nominees” (p. 26), indicating that fairness and preventing
partisanship were of paramount importance even if it meant making decisions that
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ignored subjective circumstances. This entire narrative is anomaly-masking
communication as Alexander is failing to counter-persuade against his opponents, who
could easily name his decision to limit questioning as rushing DeVos through or avoiding
public scrutiny as a decision motivated by partisanship.
Alexander’s final tactic aimed at deflecting the Democrats’ criticisms involved
using repressive tolerance to normalize DeVos’ nomination and also came as a response
to Franken. After Franken corrected DeVos’ incorrect student loan debt statistic, he
ended his question period by addressing the chairman and raising concerns with the lack
of a second round of questions.
Franken: That's why we want more questions, because we want to know if this
person that we are entrusting, may entrust, to be the Secretary of Education, if she
has the breadth and depth of knowledge that we would expect from someone who
has that important uh that important job. Thank you.
Alexander: Thank you, Senator Franken. I had as many disagreements with
Secretary King as you apparently do with Ms. DeVos. We are treating her the
exact same way that we treated him. I think that’s what I would call the Golden
Rule. (p. 26)
By suggesting he had as many issues with John King as Franken had with DeVos,
Alexander managed to not only deflect Franken’s criticism but also imply that the
“controversy” Democrats were “creating” about DeVos’ qualifications was normal, and
an example of an enduring political difference. Though relatively understated, this
rhetorical maneuver indicates that Alexander is also endorsing DeVos’ qualifications by
equating her to previous Secretary of Education nominees. This move is an example of

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

73

repressive tolerance, a strategy used to stifle dissent by entreating the minority to “listen
instead of protest” (Sculos & Walsh, 2016, p. 516), thereby resituating blame by naming
the minority as disruptive and part of the problem. Alexander’s “Golden Rule” rationale
managed to emphasize his own credibility, normalize DeVos’ nomination, and create an
argument that accused Democrats of opposing DeVos for purely insincere political
reasons.
Democrats attempted to persuade Alexander with anomaly-featuring
communication that raised ethical, procedural, and partisan concerns with limiting
questions to one round. Senator Murray’s opening remarks were the first instance in
which Democratic concerns with the hearing’s agenda were raised, and she took issue
with DeVos’ ethics disclosures being incomplete at the time of hearing. After
enumerating several other issues she hoped to discuss with DeVos, Murray concluded her
opening remarks by foregrounding the popular will of the minority to have a second
round of questions.
I’m hopeful that this can be a smooth process, but, Mr. Chairman, I know my
members are all here tonight. They are hoping for more than just five minutes of
questions on this critical nominee and I hope that as we get through this you will
consider doing that. (Nomination of Betsy DeVos to serve as Secretary of
Education, 2017, p. 6)
When Alexander responded by pointing out that his procedure was identical to the
procedure followed with secretary-nominees Duncan and King from the Obama
administration, Murray sought to draw attention to gaps in Alexander’s explanation by
differentiating the Obama nominees from DeVos. “Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just say
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that nobody asked for additional time for at that point. So, I hope that as we get through
this hearing we hear members’ questions, we’ll have an opportunity to revisit” (p. 7).
Senator Bennet continued differentiating the two scenarios, further drawing attention to
Alexander’s anomalous rationale.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In view of how fair you have been to me and other
members, it pains me to say this, I really wish we had a second round of questions
too. I really wish we had the tax returns for this nominee. I don't believe you are a
precedent for this. When you became—when you were the nominee, you’d been a
governor, you’d been the president of a university. John King had been a school
principal, had been the commissioner of education in the State of New York. Arne
Duncan had been the superintendent of Chicago public schools. Those were the
experiences they brought to their committee hearing, and their records were wellknown and well established. There is no way in the period of time that we have
that we’re going to be able to elicit that level of background. I would ask that
some consideration be given to having additional questions, and that the tax
returns be made available to the committee. (p. 28-29)
Bennet’s clear delineation between the current situation and the scenarios Alexander
referred to as precedent showed that, if Alexander was truly interested in fairness or
parity, he would acknowledge the fundamentally different nature of DeVos as a nominee.
By showing that Alexander’s rationale was anything but fair or reasonable, Democrats
like Murray and Bennet highlighted the ethical reasons that limiting questions was a
mistake.
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Other Democratic senators pointed out procedural flaws in Alexander’s argument,
namely that limiting questions would not yield adequate information and that the
chairman’s definition of precedent was overly-narrow. Senator Franken was a key
proponent of this procedural argument, as he stated “we are selling our kids short by not
being able to have a debate… I did not know of any rule about everyone getting one
question” (p. 25) and that “virtually every member of the minority is asking to ask more
questions and that’s a very substantial difference” (p. 26). Here, Franken simultaneously
advanced both prongs of the procedural argument by foregrounding the fact that
constituents are harmed by not fully vetting nominees and by troubling Alexander’s
explanation of precedent. This attention shift encouraged audiences to see the chairman’s
symbolic construction of precedent may have, more accurately, been precedent that
advances a partisan agenda. Similarly, Senator Whitehouse remarked that he could not
remember ever have being told “I could never have a second round in a hearing as a
matter of principle before” (p. 33), highlighting the apparent arbitrary and individual
nature of Alexander’s decision. Once again, Senator Bennet succinctly and articulately
laid out the fundamental difference between DeVos nomination and the supposedly
relevant precedent.
To me, the fact that Republican members of the Senate did not want to ask a
second round of questions for the Obama nominee to the Senate, the idea that that
should be a precedent for the Democrats, eight of whom are here tonight – to ask
questions—even follow-up questions that we have heard tonight, I think is really
unfair and uncharacteristic. (p. 54)
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Senator Warren also cast doubt on the chairman’s construction of precedent by saying,
“Can I just ask about the precedent?... When we go back and examine the record, will we
find instances where people asked for a second round of questions and were refused” (p.
56)? When Alexander declined to answer and repeated his parity with Obama nominees
argument, Warren redeployed the type of rhetorical maneuvers she had used against
DeVos on the chairman.
Warren: Mr. Chairman, I want to be clear, then this is the first time that someone
has asked for a second round of questions and been refused?
Alexander: No- no no no, no one ever said that except you.
Warren: But, you haven’t said otherwise—
Alexander: No, well, now that’s an Alice in Wonder—I mean, Lewis Carroll
would be proud of that – that’s a little exceptional.
Warren: I'm sorry, did you say that you refused anyone a second round?
Alexander: No, I said that Lewis Carroll would be proud of that kind of reasoning.
What I’m saying is I looked straightforwardly at the process that we had with
President Obama's education secretaries and we determined we would do the
same thing for President-elect Trump's nominee. (p. 56)
As with her questioning of DeVos, Warren’s aggressive demeanor—which Alexander
was quick to point out and dismiss with a literary allusion—may have negatively
impacted her credibility, but it did foreground the flexible nature of the definition of
“precedent.” This anomaly-featuring communication was complemented by a call for
transparency from Senator Baldwin, who stated “I wanted to weigh in also that I hope we
will get additional opportunity to ask questions. I would like it to be not in writing but to
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give the American people the chance to hear the exchange and responses” (p. 35), raised
concerns with gaps in Alexander’s “word about process” (p. 1) and attempted to get the
notoriously fair chairman to reconsider.
The final Democratic intervention to help Alexander recognize the “unfairness” of
his rationale came in attempts to take what the chairman saw as preventing partisanship
and rename it as motivated by partisanship. The primary support for this name came from
Senator Murray, who began her second round of final questions as the ranking member
by once again raising issues with Alexander’s decision. In language that was both
accusatory and apologetic, Murray foregrounded the potentially partisan nature of
limiting questions for an unqualified nominee like DeVos.
Let me just say, I am really disappointed that you have preemptively cut off our
members from asking questions. It really is unprecedented. And you and I have
worked together, and I appreciate that, but I hope you change your mind. I don't
know what you are trying to protect Ms. DeVos from. She should get robust
scrutiny. (p. 52)
It seems strategic that the most overt questioning of Alexander’s intentions came in the
last half hour of the meeting; Democrats were slow to question the chairman’s motives.
Rather than resorting to ad hominem attacks or thinly-veiled accusations, Democrats
raised significant issues with limiting the number of questions DeVos could be asked
with a multi-pronged, well-supported series of arguments while also recognizing
Alexander’s reputation for fairness. In doing so, the Democrats’ anomaly-featuring
communication left one anomaly conveniently unexplained: if Alexander is the fairest
man in D.C., why is he behaving so unfairly? By raising the question without answering
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it, Murray induces cognitive dissonance in the social system by implicitly naming
Alexander’s activity as motivated by partisanship and leaving the audience to draw their
own conclusions about the most likely explanation for this gap in named experience.
Having examined both Alexander’s power intervention and the Democrats’ failed
attempts to persuade him to withdraw his sanctions, a few key observations can be drawn
about the effectiveness of this intervention. Given the numerous reasons Democrats
found to raise issues with the chairman’s symbolic construction of committee precedent,
it seems likely Alexander’s unwillingness to yield was motivated by something partisan.
Alexander’s failure to justify why his precedent excluded the numerous alternative
precedents raised by Democrats caused his obstreperousness to be perceived as motivated
by partisanship and insincere. Had the chairman provided a reasonable explanation as to
why his precedent focused solely on 1991 and the two Obama education secretary
nominees, thereby reconciling a major gap in his symbolic construction of precedent, he
may have been better able to name his own motives sincere and fair.
Charter school accountability. The other secondary intervention that pervaded
the HELP Committee hearing on Betsy DeVos’ nomination regarded charter schools and
whether or not they were reputable and worthy of federal investment. As this battle over
the symbolic construction of charter schools is an ideograph for both traditionally
conservative and liberal ideologies, perceptions of what the name “charter school”
indicates were also influential over views of DeVos’ qualifications, which are based
heavily in charter school philanthropy and advocacy. The main intervention in this
narrative comes from Democrats in the attention subsystem, as they used anomalyfeaturing communication to foreground the importance of accountability as a safeguard to
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ensure quality education and safe investment of federal taxpayer dollars. To see the
impact of naming charter schools as either accountable and innovative or unaccountable
and unworthy of taxpayer dollars, this section will examine the Republicans’ attempts to
name DeVos’ experience and charter schools in general as well as Democrats’ competing
attention shift aimed at negatively impacting DeVos’ credibility.
Prior to the Democrats’ attempts to name charter schools as unaccountable,
Republicans used their opening remarks and questioning periods to depict charter schools
as having bipartisan appeal, sufficient accountability measures, and serving
disadvantaged students. Alexander used part of his opening remarks to list, in some
detail, a cadre of politicians from both parties who have supported charter schools
including Presidents H.W. Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama, Senator Hillary Clinton,
Secretaries King and Duncan, and himself as Secretary of Education. Additionally, the
chairman was sure to point out that the idea for charter schools originated from the
Minnesota Democratic Farmer Labor Party (DFL), naming the very nature of “charter
schools” as bipartisan. This anomaly-masking communication made no mention of
concerns about accountability, instead choosing to foreground the sheer number of
Democrats and Republicans that support “charter schools.” Defense of these schools as
accountable followed shortly thereafter during Senator Scott’s introduction of DeVos
where the Republican foregrounded charter schools as a means of helping
underprivileged children to bolster DeVos’ credentials.
Mrs. DeVos is clearly not opposed to accountability. What she’s opposed to is
holding some schools accountable but not all schools. What she’s opposed to is
leaving children trapped in schools that we know... we know are failing. Failing
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the very students that will have no hope if they do not receive a high quality
education. (p. 8)
By this logic, whether DeVos’ record on accountability is credible is immaterial; rather,
Scott would have the audience view the nominee as compassionate and a champion of
equal opportunity rather than respond directly to concerns of unaccountability. The final
element of the Republican attempt to background “charter school accountability” was
added by Senator Enzi (R-WY), who foregrounded his dissatisfaction with accountability
measures under the current Secretary of Education. “You’ll inherit… the current
Department of Education’s data lacked transparency, omitted key information, made
other flawed assumptions. As an accountant, I was appalled...” (p. 13). This offhand
remark renames the current Department of Education as opaque and unaccountable;
logically, then, this prompts the audience to wonder how much harm a nominee with a
less-than-stellar record on accountability could do if the agency she has been appointed to
is already struggling with accountability. By emphasizing bipartisanship, the possible
positive impacts of charter schools, and characterizing the current Department of
Education under Secretary King as unaccountable, Republicans’ sought to rhetorically
background any concerns about DeVos’ record.
Republican efforts to sweep the issue of charter school accountability into the
background of DeVos’s hearing were ultimately unsuccessful, as Democrats used
anomaly-featuring communication to foreground many gaps in the Republicans’ naming.
The Democrats’ collective troubling of the symbolic construction of “charter schools”
emphasized numerous points of contention, including DeVos’ direct experience falling
short, the funding implications of increasing support for charter schools, and President
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Trump’s unaccountable Trump University. Initially, Senator Murray’s opening remarks
established a clear and explicit name for “charter schools.” Murray remarked that “we
[must] focus our federal policies and investments on strengthening public schools for all
students and certainly not toward diverting taxpayer dollars to fund vouchers that don’t
work for unaccountable private schools [emphasis added]” (p. 5), making clear her
skepticism about “charter schools” as a deus ex machina for the nation’s school children.
Senator Bennet used his questioning period to point out that proving the value of charter
schools is easier said than done.
According to one analysis, Detroit public schools -- and by the way, it is not easy
to figure this out because there is so little accountability in Michigan – the Detroit
public schools averaged 9%, the kids—9% of the kids are proficient. Charter
schools were a little better, 14% of the kids were proficient. I will stipulate that
charter schools are doing better, but that is a horrible outcome for everybody
involved. (p. 29)
By directly linking his concerns with unaccountable and opaque charter schools to
Detroit public schools—an organization through which some of DeVos’ advocacy had
been focused—Bennet foregrounded the inconsistencies within DeVos’ experience to
name her a part of the problem as opposed to a savior or experienced advocate. Senator
Whitehouse added his discontent with charter schools by noting that moving students
from the public system and into private charter schools creates “legacy costs” (p. 32) for
the public school system. Senator Murphy further noted that a lack of accountability
could make it possible for “education industry” capitalists to become rich by duping
taxpayers.
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Murphy: Your family has been investors in a company called K12, it’s for-profit
online charter operator. It gets about 80% of its money comes from the federal or
state taxpayers, and it paid its CEO over $1 million in a year, it’s made millions
and millions of dollars in profit. I can go through a long litany of examples in
which people have made their fortune off of public education dollars. A charter
school principal in Orlando who got a $519,000 payout when her school was
closed for poor performance. I guess my question is simple, do you support
companies and individuals profiting from public education dollars—that is
essentially taking money away from students—to pay salaries for CEOs in return
for investors?
DeVos: Senator, thank you for that question. Let me just say that when it comes
to education, I think what’s important is what the outcomes are, what the
achievements are. And I don't think the delivery mechanism is the issue as much
as it is, are students receiving the benefit of a great education?
…
Murphy: If we can't agree folks should not get rich off of schools, maybe we can
agree they shouldn’t get rich off of terrible schools. (p. 38)
This vague response, particularly in light of the insinuation that DeVos may have
benefitted from lax accountability measures, is reminiscent of DeVos’ repeated answers
of “I support accountability” (p. 49) to Senator Kaine in that her answers failed to
satisfactorily assuage her audience’s concerns. These attacks on DeVos’ personal
integrity, which were grounded in her inexperience and charter schools’ unaccountability,
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were amplified when Senator Warren noted that DeVos’ potential future boss—
President-elect Trump—also lacked credibility on this subject.
Warren: Do you support protecting federal taxpayer dollars from waste, fraud and
abuse?
DeVos: Absolutely.
Warren: Oh good, so do I. Because now we all know that President-elect Trump's
experience with higher education was to create a fake university which resulted in
his paying $125 million to students that he cheated. So I’m curious about how the
Trump Administration would protect against waste, fraud, and abuse at similar
for-profit colleges. (p. 42)
This argument implied guilt-by-association with the President, which is an uncommon
occurrence in a Senate confirmation hearing. The Democrats’ attention intervention
against Republicans’ failure to address accountability issues with private charter schools
used anomaly-featuring communication to draw attention to unexplained gaps in their
interpretation, namely that DeVos had been involved with charter schools that are
inherently unaccountable and undeserving of federal funds. Though this issue was far
from resolved during the HELP Committee hearing, the ideological nature of buying into
or disregarding “charter schools” as a legitimate policy option surfaced during DeVos’
hearing, making it likely that similar ideological differences would plague the remainder
of her confirmation process.
Moral Rhetoric
Selected statements from Democratic and Republican senators were analyzed
using the LIWC program and the DeVos Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD) to

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

84

Table 2: Democrats’ and Republicans’ varied use of moral rhetoric during the HELP
Committee’s confirmation of Betsy DeVos to be US Secretary of Education, as measured
by the DeVos Moral Foundations Dictionary [see Appendix A].

measure the rate of moral rhetoric employed during the HELP Committee hearing. The
only Democratic speech to meet the criteria described in the Methods section came from
Senator Murray while Republican Senators Alexander, Hatch, and Scott each met the
requirements for measurement (see Appendix B).
Democratic rhetoric from Senator Murray was processed through LIWC to
display the rate of moral rhetoric as a percentage of total words (n=1,605), and revealed
that 1.62 percent of relevant Democratic speech was moral in nature. Though the
expected liberal appeals to the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations were
present (see Table 2), Murray’s main moral appeals were to the ingroup/loyalty and
authority/respect foundations, which are more readily recognized by conservatives (see
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Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Much of Murray’s ingroup/loyalty appeal came from her
use of the words “family” and “community,” and her calls for a “reasonable” and
“proper” process would appeal to the authority/respect foundation. The involvement of
five of the six categories in the DeVos MFD suggests that Murray was successful in
designing multifaceted moral arguments that should appeal to her conservative audience.
The combined speeches from Senators Alexander, Hatch, and Scott utilized moral
rhetoric at a rate of 1.51 percent (n=2,123). Consistent with past research on conservative
moral rhetoric, Republican moral speech registered relatively evenly across the first four
foundations (though neither Democrats nor Republicans invoked the purity/sanctity
foundation [see Table 2]). While the Democratic speech from Murray used five different
MFD foundations, they varied widely in rates of utilization from .12 percent in morality
general to .62 in ingroup/loyalty; Republican moral rhetoric, conversely, only ranged
from .33 in harm/care and fairness/reciprocity to .47 in authority/respect. Though the
Republicans did utilize the first two foundations, which are more-typically persuasive to
liberals, it is worth noting that they were used at a lower rate than the third and fourth
“conservative” moral foundations. Alexander only used two words with moral
connotations—“devoted” and “families”—but Hatch and Scott each advanced themes of
“fighting for equity in education” and “accountability” to form moral arguments. These
word choices, combined with the range of moral language present, indicate that the
messages from Republicans were primarily intended for fellow conservatives.
The usage of moral rhetoric in selected statements from the HELP Committee
hearing revealed that both Democrats and Republicans were employing moral language
that appeals to conservatives. This finding would support the supposition that Murray’s
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moral language was designed to appeal to Republicans who may have been on the fence
about DeVos’ nomination, while Republicans were attempting similar appeals to prevent
their colleagues from deserting.
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V. Senators’ Press Releases
From the time of DeVos’ nomination in November of 2016 through her full
Senate confirmation in early February of 2017, the HELP committee’s Senators took an
active role in attempting to shape public perceptions of DeVos through their official press
releases. As with later speeches on the Senate floor regarding DeVos’ confirmation,
Republicans issued considerably fewer total words (n=2,717) than Democrats (n=7,005)
in their press releases that could be analyzed for moral rhetoric per the criteria listed in
the Methods section, but this was reflective of the greater frequency of Democrats’
attempts to name DeVos through this medium. As a result, the primary intervention
analyzed in this chapter is the attention intervention Democrats’ implemented through
anomaly-featuring communication to counter Republicans’ attempts to name DeVos
qualified and charter schools bipartisan through press releases. This chapter will analyze
the Democrats intervention against Republicans and the moral rhetoric employed by each
party in their press releases.
Social System
Before proceeding with an analysis of the Democrats’ intervention against the
Republican naming of DeVos, this section must first identify the social system of this
intervention and then the Republican’s press release nomenclature for DeVos.
The most significant difference between Democrats’ attempts to name DeVos
unqualified and motivated by partisanship in press releases compared to the HELP
Committee is that press releases attempt to influence a different social system. The main
interveners in the social system of this attention intervention are still the HELP
Committee members, as their established credibility makes them policy experts who have
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a greater than average chance of influencing federal issues under their purview. While
these policy experts were undoubtedly still trying to impact their colleagues’ views of
DeVos, these press releases were also key tools in engaging the senators’ constituents and
state-level news media. As a result, the social system for this intervention includes the
U.S. public as engaged by their elected representatives as well as state and local news
media (which were, in turn, using information provided by these same elected
representatives in their reporting). Engaging their constituencies in this matter indicates
that the Senators were hoping to incite strong feelings about DeVos among the electorate,
which might then lead voters to contact other elected representatives and express support
or opposition to the president’s nominee. This section analyzes the Democrats’
intervention through press releases and examine the differences in naming strategies both
Republicans and Democrats employed compared to the rhetoric they employed in the
HELP Committee hearing, which engaged a significantly smaller social system.
Republican naming: A “small government” nominee
In Republican press releases expressing an interpretation about DeVos, Senators
emphasized DeVos’ qualifications by bolstering them with their own qualifications,
portrayed charter schools as bipartisan, and activated a traditional Republican frame by
painting DeVos as a small government nominee who would keep the federal government
out of state and local education policy. Two of the senators who sent press releases that
favored DeVos’ confirmation—Alexander and Isakson—were sure to point out their own
credibility to strengthen the persuasive impact of their endorsement. Not only did
Alexander’s press release identify him as “Chairman Lamar Alexander” in its the first
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sentence—thereby foregrounding his leadership role—his main support for advancing
DeVos’ nomination was his own experience as Secretary of Education.
Alexander, who was Education Secretary for President George H. W. Bush, said
his last act as secretary in 1993 was to ask every U.S. school district to emulate
the dozen charter schools started by the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party. Since then, he said, broad, bipartisan support has increased that number to
6,800 charter schools, attended by 2.7 million children. (Office of U.S. Senator
Lamar Alexander, 2017, para. 2)
This appeal to credibility had entered into the release’s narrative prior to his implication
that the audience should be named “fortunate” (para. 5) that DeVos was the nominee,
thereby imparting his blessing. Similarly, after “Isakson praised DeVos’ understanding
that yesterday’s ‘non-traditional’ student today makes up a large portion of students”
(Office of U.S. Senator Johnny Isakson, 2017, para. 7). Then the release noted that
Isakson “also serves as chairman of the labor and workforce subcommittee” (para. 8),
thereby enhancing his policy expert name. Alexander also directly quoted his
mainstream/bipartisan argument from the HELP Committee, which asks, “Who is in the
mainstream [regarding charter schools]? Both Presidents Bush, the President-elect, 25
states, the U.S. Congress in the D.C. Voucher program, 45 U.S. Senators, 73 percent of
Americans, Betsy DeVos, or her critics?” (Office of U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander,
2017, para. 3).
Senator Cassidy (R-LA) furthered this mainstream narrative by noting his own
support for charter schools and also introduced a new narrative: that DeVos embodied
small government ideals.
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I have made clear my commitment to taking power away from our nation’s capital
and returning it to the kitchen table, believing that parents are better suited to
decide what is best for their children than a Washington bureaucrat. Supporting
school choice and making sure that all children have access to quality education
have been top priorities… Secretary DeVos has made it clear that she will be an
agent of change to improve our schools and children’s future. (Office of U.S.
Senator Bill Cassidy, 2017, para. 2)
Isakson also contributed to DeVos’ name as small government nominee by foregrounding
their conversation about “reducing burdensome regulations” (Office of U.S. Senator
Johnny Isakson, 2017, para. 1), a key target of small government rhetoric. Senator
Roberts (R-KS) released his desire to “work with Mrs. DeVos to ensure Kansans can
make their own decisions about the best way to improve education, free from federal
interference” (Office of U.S. Senator Pat Roberts, 2017, para. 2), and Senator Murkowski
(R-AK) revealed that DeVos had committed “to defend state and local control of our
schools, to implement federal education laws as they are written, and [to] not undermine
or ignore our public schools or force vouchers in any state” in personal meetings (Office
of U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski, 2017, para. 2). The emphasis on the senators’
qualifications to bolster their endorsements combined with their focus on small
government ideals created a narrative that foregrounded DeVos’ adherence to traditional
Republican beliefs and the senators’ personal satisfaction with her qualifications. The
lack of reference to her actual qualifications and experiences also indicates that the
Republicans were aware of her deficiencies, but wanted their voting base to support her
despite that fact.
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Primary Intervention: Democrats say DeVos is an “unqualified partisan appointee”
The Democrats, dissatisfied with the Republican effort to normalize DeVos,
implemented an attention intervention prioritizing anomaly-featuring communication that
sought to rename DeVos as unqualified, incompetent, unwilling to defend marginalized
students, and a partisan appointee. A primary feature of the Democrats’ claims in press
releases was their depiction of DeVos as fundamentally unqualified, and their allusions to
her status as a partisan appointee increased substantially as many Democrats ceased
giving DeVos the benefit of the doubt following her sub-par performance before the
HELP Committee (see Table 3). In addition to advancing these semi-established names
for DeVos, Democrats’ press releases bolstered their anti-DeVos arguments by
referencing their own qualifications as policy experts as well as the strong opposition
voiced by their constituents. For instance, one of Kaine’s releases referenced his status as
“a former governor and strong supporter of public education whose three children
attended Richmond public schools” (Office of U.S. Senator Tim Kaine, 2017a, para. 1),
and another foreground the fact that “Anne and I and our kids have all been the
beneficiaries of great public schools” (Office of U.S. Senator Tim Kaine, 2017b, para. 2).
Similarly, Bennet noted his credentials as “a former superintendent of the Denver Public
Schools” (Office of U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, 2017a, para. 3). Just as Republicans
cited their own credentials to enhance the credibility of their endorsement, so too did
Democrats foreground their expertise to further their naming of DeVos as unqualified.
Numerous Democratic senators also used their press releases to acknowledge the
overwhelmingly negative response their constituents had to DeVos’ nomination, as well
as Alexander’s handling of the committee hearing, and solidify their opposition to the
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nominee. Whitehouse (D-RI) noted after the HELP Committee hearing that he “received
thousands of letters, calls, and emails in opposition to her nomination, many of them
citing the school voucher and privatization agenda of Mrs. DeVos” (Office of U.S.
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, 2017b, para. 4), which followed a previous release from
late 2016 that reported on the senator’s efforts to convene roundtables with Rhode
Islanders who had a stake in education (see Office of U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse,
2016). Combined, the use of such evidence simultaneously justifies opposition to DeVos
through constituent concerns and portrays Whitehouse as a conscientious representative.
Warren (D-MA) raised concerns about DeVos’ “paper-thin record on higher education
and student debt” (Office of U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, 2017a, para. 4), and Murphy
(D-CT) noted “I’ve never seen folks in Connecticut respond to a nominee like they did
after that hearing. Since the hearing, 11,000 people from my tiny little state called and
wrote into my office to oppose her nomination. Almost no one called in support. That’s
extraordinary” (Office of U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, 2017b, para. 3). Hassan said she
“urge[d] [her] colleagues to listen to the voices of their constituents and oppose Mrs.
DeVos’ nomination” (Office of U.S. Senator Maggie Hassan, 2017b, para. 2), thereby
foregrounding the public’s primarily negative perception of DeVos and implicitly
accusing Republicans of ignoring voters in favor of advancing a partisan agenda. Senator
Murphy furthered this partisan appointee name by suggesting Alexander’s motives for
limiting questions were political in nature.
Unfortunately though, I didn’t have time to ask. I am deeply disappointed that
Chairman Alexander, who has a well-deserved reputation for fairness, cut off the
hearing when so many questions were left unanswered. We are doing our kids a
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disservice by not thoroughly vetting Mrs. DeVos and her potentially radical ideas
for our nation's schools. (Office of U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, 2017a, para. 2)
Murphy’s accusation that Alexander was unfair was complemented by Baldwin’s (D-WI)
suggestion that DeVos’ credentials hadn’t been sufficiently inspected, as one of her
releases indicated the HELP Committee hearing had not “ensure[d] that these and other
important issues receive the scrutiny that they deserve” (Office of U.S. Senator Tammy
Baldwin, 2017, para. 4). The Democrats’ anomaly-featuring communication in press
releases largely sought to concretize names for DeVos that were established during the
HELP Committee Hearing (see Table 4), which they supported by referencing their own
qualifications as policy experts whose opinions on the topic should be trusted. Because
their communication also featured indications that DeVos, a partisan appointee, was
being shielded from scrutiny by complicit Republican senators, it appears Democrats
wanted the publics affected in this social system to be aware of both DeVos’ unfitness to
serve and the non-transparent nature of her confirmation.
The other prominent anomaly featured in the Democrats’ press releases was
renaming DeVos as unwilling to defend marginalized students, which included comments
about her confusion over IDEA, unwillingness to enforce Title IX protections, and poor
record on LGBTQ issues. This name was not foregrounded as prominently in the HELP
Committee hearing, but this is because the name was created to make sense of DeVos’
answers on those issue. In other words, DeVos’ sloppy, evasive answers across multiple
disability-related issues were best explained by the nominee possessing an unwillingness
to protect those populations. Senator Hassan (D-NH) made that point succinctly, while
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also furthering the names of unaccountable and undeserving of federal funds for charter
schools.
Mrs. DeVos' support for diverting taxpayer dollars to private, religious and forprofit schools without accountability requirements is unacceptable, as is her
failure to understand the challenges facing students with disabilities… Not only
did Mrs. DeVos fail to commit to enforcing the law to protect students with
disabilities, but she also admitted that she was confused about whether the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is a federal law. (Office of U.S.
Senator Maggie Hassan, 2017b, paras. 2-3)
Kaine, who had asked DeVos the initial question about IDEA in the HELP Committee
hearing, also mentioned IDEA in his press releases, but the other Senator to mention the
law by name was Republican Senator Susan Collins. Collins, who later voted against
DeVos’ confirmation in the Senate, was one of only two Republicans to oppose DeVos’
confirmation. Her press release mirrored Democrats’ by foregrounding the nominee’s
unwilling to defend marginalized students. The press release, which also foregrounded
Collins’ other concerns about DeVos to the media and the public, quoted a dramatic
portion of Collins’ announcement of her opposition to the nominee.
While it is unrealistic and unfair to expect a nominee to know the details of all the
programs under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education, I am troubled
and surprised by Mrs. DeVos’ apparent lack of familiarity with the landmark
1975 law, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, known as IDEA, that
guarantees a free and appropriate education to children with special needs.
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The mission of the Department of Education is broad, but supporting public
education is at its core. I am concerned that Mrs. DeVos’ lack of experience with
public schools will make it difficult for her to fully understand, identify, and assist
with those challenges, particularly for our rural schools in states like Maine… I
will not, I cannot vote to confirm her as our nation’s next Secretary of Education.
(Office of U.S. Senator Susan Collins, 2017, paras. 8-10)
Murkowski, the other Republican to vote against the confirmation, did not send a press
release about DeVos until after she had been confirmed, making Collins’ press release
announcing her opposition the only instance that a Republican invoked any of the
Democrats names for the nominee.
Democrats’ press releases also identified DeVos’ noncommittal responses to
protecting sexual assault survivors and LGBTQ students as anomalies central to their
party’s intervention against Republicans’ normalization of the nominee. Senator Casey
alluded to his credentials on protecting students who experience sexual assault—he
“introduced and passed into law the Campus SaVe Act, which put in place uniform
reporting standards for campus sexual assaults on college campuses” (Office of U.S.
Senator Bob Casey, 2017, para. 1)—before becoming the only Democratic senator to
criticize this aspect of DeVos’ inexperience in a press release.
Ms. DeVos’ answer to my question, in which she refused to commit to enforcing
the current law on campus sexual assaults contained in Title IX is deeply
troubling. We’ve come too far and have too far to go on campus sexual assaults to
go back to the days of zero accountability. A sexual assault is the ultimate
betrayal and the students of our nation deserve a Secretary of Education who will
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stand up for them, not one unwilling to commit to enforcing basic campus sexual
assault protections. (para. 2)
Casey’s statement foregrounding the centrality of protecting sexual assault survivors as a
requirement for serving as Secretary of Education added another dimension to DeVos’
unqualified name, while also highlighting one of DeVos’ most evasive answers in the
HELP Committee hearing. Additionally, Senator Murphy (D-CT) contributed to the name
unwilling to defend marginalized students when he linked DeVos’ inexperience to her
past political activism on behalf of anti-LGBTQ causes.
I was very troubled to learn that President-elect Trump plans to nominate a person
for Secretary of Education who has spent so much time funding partisan efforts to
attack public education and push anti-gay political causes… I want to know how
Congress would put someone who has spent her life trying to strip funding from
public schools in charge of those very schools. I will ask how Ms. DeVos if she
can (sic) lead the effort to build positive school climates when she has spent so
much time and money promoting discrimination against people based on their
sexual orientation. (Office of U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, 2016, paras. 2-3)
Murphy went on to portray DeVos’ responses to these types of inquiries as “threshold
questions” (para. 4), indicating he agreed with Casey’s assessment of these issues as
central qualifications for someone seeking to become U.S. Secretary of Education. In all,
this portion of the Democrats’ attention intervention featured anomalies the Republicans’
naming of DeVos—namely, that DeVos is unwilling to defend marginalized students as
evidenced by her evasive answers to simple questions. Describing these areas in which
DeVos’ answers were troubling and unsatisfactory as central parts of the education
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secretary’s job drew attention to the nominee’s unqualified name while also sending a
message about values to the social system affected by these press releases.
Moral Rhetoric
Press releases that met the criteria for analysis from both Democratic and
Republican senators were analyzed using the LIWC program and the DeVos Moral
Foundations Dictionary (MFD) to measure the rate of moral rhetoric in arguments made
for media and voters. All 10 Democratic senators from the HELP Committee sent a total
of 24 press releases that were fit for analysis (n=7,005 words) while only seven of the
committee’s 12 Republicans sent a total of eight press releases (n=2,717) (see Appendix
B). This section will describe and analyze each party’s rate of moral rhetoric.

Table 4: Democrats’ and Republicans’ varied use of moral rhetoric in their press releases
regarding the nomination of Betsy DeVos to be US Secretary of Education, as measured
by the DeVos Moral Foundations Dictionary [see Appendix A].
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On average, Democrats employed more moral language in their press releases
than in the HELP Committee hearing, indicating a shift in rhetorical strategy based on the
social system impacted by press releases. First, moral language comprised 2.3 percent of
all Democrats’ words in press releases (n=7,005), with the average senator using moral
language at a rate of 2.1 percent. Senator Kaine used moral rhetoric more than any of his
Democratic colleagues at a rate of 3.42 (n=1,314), followed by Hassan at 3.22 (n=933)
and Warren at 2.62 (n=800). Senator Whitehouse used moral rhetoric least frequently, at
.96 (n=1,046).
As was the case during the HELP Committee hearing, Democrats’ moral rhetoric
occurred in five of the six moral foundations as measured by the DeVos MFD (see Table
4). Because the Democrats once again relied most heavily on the authority/respect and
ingroup/loyalty foundations, it appears their arguments were targeted at moderate
conservatives who are less likely to be persuaded by the “liberal” harm/care and
fairness/reciprocity foundations. Some of the Democrats’ strongest appeals to the
authority/respect foundation came from Senator Baldwin, who expounded on the concept
of “respect for tradition” in her press release when referring to “Wisconsin’s… long and
proud tradition of supporting quality public education for every student” (Office of U.S.
Senator Tammy Baldwin, 2017, para. 2). Kaine also advanced this authority/respect
narrative by naming DeVos’ illiteracy on IDEA a failure to “comply” with federal
authority, and multiple Democrats mentioned the importance of education to
“communities” and “families” thereby invoking ingroup/loyalty. Senator Warren
advanced a more liberal harm/care argument by framing the job of education secretary as
someone who “protects” children and families by ensuring a quality education, and Kaine
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repeatedly invoked the importance of “accountability,” which represents the
fairness/reciprocity foundation. The Democrats’ orientation toward “conservative” moral
foundations indicates a targeted, competent persuasive effort to rename experience using
moral arguments that would appeal to the desired audience.
Unlike Democrats, Republicans utilized less moral language in their press
releases than they did in statements before the HELP Committee, suggesting their
arguments targeting this social system were not meant to activate moral intuitions.
Altogether, the Republican senators used moral language at a rate of 1.18 percent
(n=2,717), down from 1.56 in remarks during the HELP Committee hearing (n=2,123),
with the average senator using moral language at a rate of 1.09. Of the seven Republicans
who sent press releases that qualified for analysis, only three had rates of moral language
use greater than one percent: Collins at 1.63 (n=674), Roberts at 1.58 (n=631), and
Murkowski at 1.32 (n=152). Senator Isakson had the lowest rate of usage at .53 (n=563)
Republican moral language only registered in three foundations—
fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, and authority/respect—down from four in the
HELP Committee Hearing. Nearly half the Republicans’ moral language usage came
from Senator Collins’ press release in which she announced her opposition to DeVos’
confirmation, wherein the senator appealed heavily to the ingroup/loyalty and
authority/respect foundations through the use of words like “nation,” “respect,” and
“deference.” This moral orientation seems strategic given Collins’ break with the
Republican party line; though she was voting against the president-elect’s nominee,
Collins’ argument still appealed to traditionally conservative moral frames. In essence,
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though Collins was breaking ranks with her colleagues, she still “spoke Republican”
when breaking the news.
Republicans and Democrats took fundamentally different approaches to the moral
rhetoric they employed in their press releases. First, while Democrats increased the
prevalence of their moral rhetoric and appealed to their audience using traditionallyconservative moral foundations, Republicans confined themselves to traditionally
conservative foundations and decreased the moral nature of this appeal. This change in
tact suggests not only that they were not keen to activate moral frames in the minds of
their audience, but also that they tried less hard to engage Democratic moral systems
when the opposition party was not in the room. Second, though Democrats’ moral
rhetoric usage was similar to tactics employed by Senator Murray in the HELP
Committee’s hearing, the rate of moral language increased from 1.62 to 2.3 percent. This
increase in moral language could represent an evolution of the Democrats’ self-named
role as loyal opposition. Though they started the confirmation process with a more open
mind, as the minority party of loyal opposition it stands that Democrats’ displeasure with
DeVos’ answers to questions would translate into increasingly argumentative rhetoric
aimed at stopping the nominee’s progress by invoking moral foundations. The change in
social system from being comprised of mostly senators during the HELP Committee
hearing to media organizations and constituents in press releases had a considerable
impact on the ways members of each party employed moral language to activate flashes
of affect in their audience.
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VI. Speeches on the Senate Floor
The debate over DeVos’ nomination came to a head on the Senate floor, as
Democrats tried to convince one more Republicans to join them in opposing the nominee.
Senators had 30 hours of executive session in which to voice their support or opposition
to DeVos’ confirmation, all of which began on February 6, 2017, and continued through
the night into February 7. Though the vote at noon on February 7 yielded a 50-50 tie,
Vice President Pence cast the tiebreaking vote to confirm the DeVos as the 11th U.S.
Secretary of Education. The close nature of this vote makes it increasingly likely that
Democrats were still engaging Republicans with true attempts at persuasive conversion,
while Republicans kept a comparatively low-profile on the Senate floor. This was
reflected by the fact that Democrats uttered nearly 14 times as many words (n=158,718)
as Republicans did on the Senate floor regarding this nominee (n=11574). To analyze the
rhetorical changes that unfolded in this stage of the confirmation process, this section will
explore the primary and secondary interventions made by Democrats against the
Republican normalization of DeVos’ nomination and then break down the use of moral
language by both parties.
The primary name reinforced by Democrats for DeVos during the final hours of
the Senate’s executive session debate was that the nominee was undeserving of
confirmation, which combined elements of the previous unqualified and incompetent
names to make a declarative statement against DeVos. Before exploring this attention
intervention by Democrats, this section must first identify the distinct social system in
which this intervention took place as well as the Republicans’ floor arguments against
which Democrats rebelled.
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Social System
While the HELP Committee hearing and senators’ press releases targeted internal
and external audiences, respectively, the Senate floor speeches targeted a hybrid social
system that influenced both elected representatives as well as media and the voting
public. Democrats’ persuasive intent was aimed at provoking an attention shift that
foregrounded DeVos’ unpreparedness to serve as Secretary of Education, which the
senators supported with references to historical precedent and ample evidence they
received from constituents who opposed DeVos. These tactics served two purposes: first,
as Democrats repeatedly stated, was to get “just need one more [Republican]… [to] stand
with our constituents and say no to Betsy DeVos” (163[20] Cong. Rec. S688, 2017), and
second, to prompt widespread media coverage and mobilize popular resentment for the
nominee. The latter was accomplished through Democrats’ decision to hold the Senate
floor through the night of February 6 and a 12-hour period beginning at midnight on
February 7, which symbolized the extraordinary nature of their opposition to DeVos and
provided the news media with hours of footage and discourse to share with their
audiences. As a result, this social system subsumes many elements of the prior two
systems to simultaneously exert direct pressure on Republicans to oppose DeVos while
inciting the American public to contact Republicans with the same message.
Republican naming: Democrats are obstructionists without a goal
In the 30 hours of executive session debate that preceded DeVos’ confirmation
vote, only five Republicans took the floor to defend DeVos as a mainstream, qualified
nominee and portray Democrats as obstructionists without a goal (see Appendix B).
Chairman Alexander was the first Republican senator to advocate on behalf of DeVos’
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confirmation when he announced her nomination had passed the HELP Committee on the
Senate floor January 24, 2017. In this floor speech, Alexander named Democrats as
having no real reason to oppose DeVos other than the fact she was nominated by a
Republican president.
Democratic Senators are searching for a valid reason to oppose the President’s
nomination of Betsy DeVos to be U.S. Education Secretary because they really
don’t want Americans to know what their real reason is. Here is the real reason:
Betsy DeVos has spent the last 30 years—actually more than 30 years—being
dedicated to helping low-income children in America have more of the same
choices of schools that wealthy Americans already have. Specifically, the
Democrats object to the fact that Betsy DeVos supports the idea of tax dollars
following low-income children to the school that their parents may choose—
public, private, or religious. (163[13] Cong. Rec. S409, 2017)
The chairman portrayed the Democrats’ objections as purely partisan and lacking in
substance, and his tone often drifted toward sarcasm and incredulity, as he asserted that
no reasonable individual could dispute DeVos’ credentials. As he put it, “I mean, how
can you turn down a woman for U.S. Secretary when she spent 30 years of her life trying
to help low-income children find a better school?” (S410). Senator John Cornyn (R-TX)
helped concretize the Democrats’ name of obstructionists without a goal by noting the
Republican majority would inevitably approve DeVos and ascribing a motive to the
minority party.
I regret that petty politics has gotten in the way of the ability of our colleagues
across the aisle to get over the fact that the election didn’t turn out quite the way
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they hoped and to get back to work on behalf of the American people… Now, 18
days after President Trump’s inauguration, he still doesn’t have the help he needs
in these critical posts. I believe this kind of mindless obstruction is actually
irresponsible, if not downright dangerous. (163[20] Cong. Rec. S701, 2017)
These arguments did not engage with Democrats’ previously-voiced concerns about
DeVos’ experience and were therefore unlikely to change any minority party members’
minds about how to vote, indicating that these arguments were meant to provide tribal
cues to Republican voters.
Additionally, DeVos was named qualified by all five Republicans to speak in
support of her confirmation, and they foregrounded DeVos’ status as a champion of small
government to add ideological heft to their rationale for supporting her. Senator James
Lankford (R-OK) furthered this narrative, which was designed to resonate with
traditional “small government” conservatives, that supported DeVos’ confirmation based
on her ideological qualifications without re-litigating her actual professional experiences.
If a local district or if a State chose to provide other options, it is not her role in
the Federal Government to try to stand in the way of that. Quite frankly, I find it
refreshing that someone would say: We are not going to run your school from
Washington, DC. What you choose to do in your schools, you are allowed to do.
(163[19] Cong. Rec. S669, 2017)
Rather than describing DeVos’ qualifications as an individual, Republican rhetoric
decentered DeVos by portraying her as a symbolic figurehead who represented
traditionally-conservative ideals and depicting Democrats as bitter liberals. In this
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manner, Republicans’ arguments for the nominee were less “pro-DeVos” as they were
“anti-Democrat.”
Finally, Republicans also attempted to show that DeVos had wide popular support
by entering into the record the endorsements of numerous professional organizations as
well as current and former elected officials. This tactic was no doubt meant to counter the
considerable number of letters from constituents that Democratic senators read on the
floor; however, it is notable that no Republican quoted words of support for DeVos from
average voters. Though enumerating the professional organizations that supported DeVos
may have functioned as a peripheral persuasive cue from political elites to Republican
voters, Republicans’ failure to counter Democrats’ naming of constituent feedback as
overwhelmingly against DeVos represented a considerable anomaly. As a result,
Republican rhetoric may have inadvertently reinforced Democrats’ later claims that
Republicans were supporting DeVos for partisan reasons that actively ignored popular
opinion in favor of showing deference to the new president.
Primary Intervention: Democrats say DeVos is “undeserving of confirmation”
Democrats railed against this Republican attempt to background DeVos’
inexperience and incompetence by performing an attention intervention that
foregrounded the nominee’s ill-preparedness to assume office. This intervention, which
named DeVos undeserving of confirmation and perpetuated previously-established names
for the nominee (see Table 5), synthesized the Democrats’ prior efforts to name DeVos
unqualified and incompetent, and also used her inadequate answers to senators’ HELP
Committee questions to demonstrate their point. Additionally, this characterization of
DeVos’ experience was bolstered by the senators’ own experiences with education as
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well as numerous references to historical precedent that highlighted both the importance
of public education in U.S. as well as the abnormal decision to limit questions in the
HELP Committee hearing. Together, these arguments position DeVos as not merely a
poor fit for Secretary of Education, but as the ideological antithesis to the expectancy of
U.S. public education.
First, Democrats’ previous names for DeVos as unqualified and incompetent were
synthesized into the definitive name undeserving of confirmation as the senators made
their final arguments against President Trump’s nominee for Secretary of Education. This
attention shift was promoted by numerous statements from the Democrats who spoke
against DeVos’ confirmation (see Table 5), and the context of the remarks reflected a
new persuasive purpose. As these floor speeches were the last chance Democrats had to
derail DeVos’ confirmation, their arguments increasingly rested on the partisan nature of
Republican support for the nominee. By this point in the process, DeVos’ lack of
qualifications were considered self-evident. For example, Senator Blumenthal restated his
emphatic belief that DeVos was not fit to serve. However, rather than blaming the
nominee for allowing herself to be considered for a position she lacked experience for,
Blumenthal foregrounded her position as a partisan appointee to blame Republicans for
letting the situation get this far.
She is unquestionably unqualified, unknowledgeable, unprepared for this job. She
is unfit to run the Department of Education. As hard and as unkind as that verdict
sounds, we have an obligation to speak truth here and speak that truth to power,
even when it is the President of the United States, even when it is a job as
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critically important as Secretary of Education—especially when it is as important
as this job. (162[20 pt. II] Cong. Rec S797, 2017)
This argument advanced existing Democratic names for DeVos while simultaneously
appealing to Republicans’ sense of propriety as elected representatives, showing
Blumenthal was still actively attempting to convert his Republican colleagues’ beliefs
about the nominee to align with his own. Similarly, Franken foregrounded the hypocrisy
inherent in Republican support for an inexperienced nominee by comparing DeVos’ poor
response to his “proficiency versus growth” question to other high-ranking government
offices.
I asked for her opinion on this very basic—this extremely basic—extremely
important question [about the relative merits of measuring proficiency versus
growth], and she had no idea what I was talking about. Let me be clear. She
wasn’t reluctant to declare her opinion. She wasn’t trying to strike a middle
ground. She did not know what I was talking about. We would not accept a
Secretary of Defense who couldn’t name the branches of the military. We would
not accept a Secretary of State who couldn’t identify Europe on a map. We would
not accept a Treasury Secretary who doesn’t understand multiplication. In fact, in
nearly any circumstance, if a candidate for a job is asked a question that basic and
that important and simply whiffs on it the way that Mrs. DeVos did, there is no
second question. There is just a thank you for your time, and we will let you
know, and will you please send in the next candidate. (163[20] Cong. Rec. S730,
2017)
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This tactic, which concluded by comparing DeVos’ HELP Committee hearing to a job
interview, alluded to a traditional Republican free market value: that capitalism rewards
competence and success. By foregrounding DeVos’ subpar performance and its direct
contradiction with Republican values, Franken’s answers exemplified Democratic
strategy of directing attention to anomalies in Senate floor speeches.
Another key element of Democrats’ anomaly-featuring communication was the
foregrounding of DeVos’ many gaffes throughout her confirmation process; namely, her
answers on IDEA, campus sexual assault prevention, and protecting LGBTQ students.
Democrats mentioned the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act by its full name 53
times in their floor speeches and named DeVos’ “confusion” about whether or not it was
a federal law as a cover for her “unwillingness to protect all students.” Senator Hassan
personalized the issue by conveying her family’s experience raising a special needs child,
and many others portrayed IDEA as one of the most historically-significant federal
education laws ever passed. This maneuver served not only to highlight the absurdity of a
nominee for Secretary of Education being unaware of this law, but also to reinforce a key
value any education secretary should hold: a commitment to providing all students with a
free primary education. Senator Casey (D-PA) furthered this argument by naming failure
to enforce Title IX sexual assault reporting policies as an infringement of basic human
rights.
Hundreds of years ago, St. Augustine said: “Without justice, what are kingdoms
but great bands of robbers?” If we don’t get serious about this problem—the
problem of sexual assault and what happens to young women on our college
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campuses—we are robbing them of basic justice. We are robbing them of an
opportunity to get a higher education. (163[20 pt. II] Cong. Rec. S763, 2017)
Renaming Title IX protections as a safeguard against injustice invokes a moral, as well
as religious, frame, and resituates DeVos’ noncommittal attitude toward enforcing civil
rights law as an act of inhumanity. Such an argument, which was bolstered by similar
refrains from other Senators (see Table 5), also applied to DeVos’ personal and family
history of supporting gay conversion therapy programs. By naming these beliefs a
violation of the promise to provide all students with a high-quality education, Democrats
renamed what Republicans may have called DeVos’ “personal or religious beliefs” about
civil and LGBTQ rights a dereliction of duty, thereby proving her incapacity to serve.
Senator Murphy synthesized the Democrat’s undeserving of confirmation name by
explaining DeVos’ unsatisfactory experience as the result of an inability to empathize
with children that require the most protection.
So at some point, you have to figure out that where there is smoke, there is fire.
She has been given all of these opportunities to say: I am going to be a champion
for disabled kids. I am going to stand up for minority kids. I am going to make
sure that every child, no matter their race, no matter their religion, no matter their
learning ability, gets an equal education. Every time she was given an opportunity
to set the record straight, she obfuscated, she fudged, she clouded… If you are
going to be Secretary of Education, you need to have a moral commitment to
protect these kids, but at the very least you have to know what the Federal laws
are that provide those protections. Over and over again, she was given the chance
to show that moral commitment; she did not. And in that hearing, she showed a
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troubling lack of knowledge about the statutes that protect those children. The
Secretary of Education, more than anybody else in this country, is responsible for
delivering results for our kids. The Federal Government is not in education,
except for the cause of civil rights. (163[20 pt. II] Cong. Rec. S785, 2017)
By foregrounding the original reason the federal government became involved in public
education—to ensure racial integration and equality of access—alongside DeVos’
repeated failures to defend IDEA, Title IX, and LGBTQ students, Murphy and fellow
Democrats elevated DeVos inexperience to a level beyond a simple lack of qualifications.
Rather, voting to confirm DeVos became tantamount to supporting a regression of federal
civil rights laws and abandoning the country’s most vulnerable student populations,
making Republican support for DeVos a matter that transcends partisanship and implies
instead a failure of moral leadership.
Secondary Interventions
While the vast majority of Democratic arguments against DeVos focused on her
being undeserving of confirmation, two secondary interventions were also advanced
prominently before this social system. The first of these two attention interventions
focused on the historic and overwhelming response from constituents to DeVos’
confirmation, while the second differentiated “charter schools” from DeVos’ support for
“privatization of public education” as a means of generating profit.
Communication from constituencies. Even as Democrats advanced their
anomaly-featuring communication about DeVos’ lack of experience and basic knowledge
of education policy, many members also pointed out another anomaly that Republicans
backgrounded: a failure to acknowledge the overwhelmingly negative public sentiment
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toward DeVos’ confirmation. Democrats established three names for the nature of
constituent feedback they received: that it was historic, overwhelmingly against DeVos,
and ignored by Republicans (see Table 6).
Democratic senators described the public outcry over DeVos’ nomination in great
detail, often citing the number of unique calls and e-mails they received opposing the
nomination. These figures, which ranged from 3,000 responses to 100,000, helped those
viewing the floor speeches develop a quantitative sense of U.S. Americans’ outrage.
These data points, combined with repeated remarks about how the call volume from
constituents dissatisfied with DeVos had overwhelmed the capitol’s phone system,
begged two obvious questions: why and how were Republicans seemingly oblivious to
this constituent feedback? Senator Scott, the Republican who had introduced DeVos at
the HELP Committee hearing, attempted to differentiate between calls from his South
Carolinian constituents and calls from out-of-state activists by noting that he “certainly
had a ton of calls from outside the state” (163[20 pt. II] Cong. Rec. S767, 2017), thereby
implying that even if he did receive calls opposing DeVos they were not representative of
the constituency he served. Senator Durbin (D-IL) countered by asserting DeVos’
nomination was the result of pay-for-play politics because of her more-than $200 million
in contributions to the Republican party. Though Durbin acknowledged both Democrats
and Republicans have been guilty of rewarding campaign donors with federal offices for
hundreds of years, he suggested that DeVos’ “thin resume” and “big wallet” (S795)
would be more appropriately rewarded with the Ambassadorship to Aruba. Coons (DDE) built upon this idea by suggesting Alexander’s “Golden Rule” was a false
justification to advance a purely partisan appointee with no regard for public outcry.
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[We] were limited to one round of 5 minutes for questions, hardly sufficient for
any nominee, let alone a controversial nominee with no public education
experience other than undermining the underpinnings of the public school system,
we can only conclude that there was something behind this effort to race Mrs.
DeVos forward. (S807)
By foregrounding considerable anomalies in Republicans attempts to normalize DeVos in
the face of historic public outrage, Democrats left little doubt as to why Republicans
were supporting such an unqualified nominee. In doing so, Democrats’ secondary
attention intervention seems aimed at inflaming an already dissatisfied public by drawing
attention to the blatantly partisan behavior of the majority party while concurrently
advancing their self-name of loyal opposition.
“Charter schools” vs. “privatization.” The other prominent rhetorical
development to come from Democrats’ floor speeches was the renaming of DeVos’
support for “charter schools” or “school choice” as support for privatization of public
education in a manner designed for profit (see Table 7).
In Chairman Alexander’s initial floor speech announcing DeVos’ nomination had
passed through the HELP Committee, he reiterated his characterization of “charter
schools” as a bipartisan solution to problems with the public education system. Senator
Scott attempted to reframe Democratic resistance to charter schools as being biased
against “kids trapped in failing school districts and underperforming schools” (163[20 pt.
II] Cong. Rec. S768, 2017), but this name failed to gain purchase with other senators as
countless Democrats pointed out the differences between charter schools with bipartisan
support and for-profit charters. Multiple Democrats framed the issue as a matter of
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accountability, which drew on DeVos’ uninspiring response to Senator Kaine’s question
about accountability in the HELP Committee, though Markey (D-MA) outlined the
Democratic response most comprehensively and succinctly.
The success of our public charter schools is largely due to very strong
accountability measures brought about through State regulations and rigorous
oversight. That is the key to our charter school system. It is accountability. It is
oversight…When the Michigan State Legislature introduced a bipartisan bill that
would have expanded oversight of charter schools, Betsy DeVos stepped in. She
and her family donated $1.45 million to State legislators in order to strip the
helpful oversight accountability language out of the bill… Betsy DeVos and her
unlimited funding ultimately succeeded in blocking the commonsense
accountability legislation… In addition to the private schools that benefit from a
voucher system, 80 percent of the charter schools in Michigan are run by forprofit companies, a much higher percentage than any other state. These
companies are focused first and foremost on making money. (162[20] Cong. Rec.
S713, 2017)
Markey’s description of DeVos’ direct monetary intervention to prevent oversight from
occurring provided strong support for Democrats’ depiction of the nominee as antiaccountability. Though numerous senators of both parties alluded to their support for
charter schools and voucher programs, Democrats’ sharp focus on accountability as a
necessary part of any school choice program clearly delineated the two parties’ thoughts
on the issue. By citing DeVos’ record on accountability and noting her preference for for-
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profit charter schools, Democrats successfully shifted attention to major anomalies in the
Republicans’ support for the nominee.
Moral Rhetoric
Speeches from Democratic and Republican senators who spoke during the full
Senate’s debate preceding DeVos’ confirmation vote were analyzed using the DeVos
MFD in LIWC (see Appendix A). In all, 43 Democrats spoke against DeVos’
confirmation and urged one more Republican to oppose the nominee (n=158,718) while
only five Republicans defended DeVos (n=11,574). Though the sum of Democrats’ total
words was nearly 14 times greater than that of Republicans, these speeches still represent
the greatest data set that was analyzed for moral rhetoric in this study for both parties.

Table 8: Democrats’ and Republicans’ varied use of moral rhetoric in their speeches on
the Senate Floor regarding the confirmation of DeVos, as measured by the DeVos Moral
Foundations Dictionary [see Appendix A]. Moral rhetoric is measured as a percentage of
total words contained in qualifying portions of the senators’ speeches (Democrats n =
158,718, Republicans n = 11,574).
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The Democratic loyal opposition to DeVos’ nomination came to a head during the
floor debate, and attempts to recruit an additional Republican defector to oppose the
nominee yielded significant moral appeals across all foundations. Democrats’ moral
language represented 1.88% of total words spoken in speeches, down from 2.3 in their
press releases. Senator Cardin’s (D-MD) speech (n=1,635) featured the highest rate of
moral rhetoric at 3.18%, followed by Feinstein (n=599) at 3.01 and Markey (n=1,712) at
2.63. It is worth noting, however, that Murray spoke far more than any other Democrat
(n=21,196) followed by Kaine (n=9,225); these high word counts, boosted in part by
reading correspondence from constituents aloud in the Senate chamber, contributed to
lower rates of moral language at 1.74 and 1.73 respectively. Because the length of
individual senators’ remarks varied so widely in this instance, the meta-analysis of all
Democratic speeches provides a clearer picture of how the minority party used moral
rhetoric to activate affective responses within this social system.
Democratic moral rhetoric followed the pattern established in both the HELP
Committee hearing and senators’ press releases, though the floor speeches registered
language in all six moral foundations (see Table 8). The authority/respect foundation, a
typically-conservative moral framework, was once again the primary type of moral
rhetoric employed by Democrats, followed closely by ingroup/loyalty. Though liberal
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity arguments were the two next most-prevalent
foundations to undergird the minority’s arguments, the focus on traditionallyconservative appeals indicates that Democrats were using language that targeted the
moral system of the Republican colleagues. Though this does not necessarily indicate a
competent persuasive effort, it at least demonstrates that the Democrats’ final efforts to
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derail Trump’s education nominee did not fall prey to the U.S. American tendency to
“spontaneously craft messages grounded in their own sense of morality” (Feinberg &
Willer, 2015, p. 1665). Much of the authority/respect and ingroup/loyalty appeals came
from persistent appeals to the importance of education for “communities” and “families,”
as well as citations of precedent from the “nation’s” history and tradition of enforcing
federal laws like IDEA. Though the Democrats’ frequent use of the word “individual”
(which occurred 107 times) artificially inflated the results of the ingroup/loyalty
foundation—it was used as a proper noun 53 times in reference to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act—removing all mentions of IDEA only reduced that
foundation from representing .54 to .51% of total speech.
Additionally, this was the first time either party invoked the purity/sanctity
foundation, and it was more prevalent in Democrats’ speech (.02% of total speech
compared to Republicans’ .01). While some of these appeals were relatively banal,
accusing DeVos of supporting “lax” accountability measures or “exploitation” of
taxpayers, others resituated supporting DeVos as a moral violation. For instance, Senator
Casey lambasted DeVos’s noncommittal response to enforcing Title IX violations as a
“stain on our country” (163[20 pt. II] Cong. Rec. S763, 2017), and Senator Heinrich (DNM) reframed the DeVos vote as a referendum on supporting children. “As the members
of the Zuni Pueblo wrote to me in their letter, ‘our children are our most sacred
(emphasis added) gifts.’ This is what we are voting on with this confirmation” (163[20]
Cong. Rec. S710, 2017). This purity/sanctity appeal, which developed evolutionarily to
protect growing societies (see Haidt & Graham, 2007), was designed to personalize the

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

122

importance of opposing DeVos’ nomination by triggering a deeply ingrained impulse to
protect one’s children and community from harm.
Republicans’ rate of moral language use was roughly half that of Democrats and
focused overwhelmingly on the ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect foundations. In all,
1.01% of Republican words spoken (n=11,754) were moral in nature, which is a lower
rate than was present for Republicans in either the HELP Committee hearing or the
senators’ press releases. Senator McConnell (n=842) led the Republicans in the use of
moral language with a rate of 1.9%, followed by Cornyn (n=1,761) at 1.42 and Scott
(n=3,194) at .91. Republicans also used language that fell into each of the six MFD
categories (see Table 8), though nearly half of their moral language fell into the
ingroup/loyalty foundation. This is reflective of a deliberate attempt to name the
confirmation vote as an us versus them issue by using both positive and negative appeals.
For instance, supporting DeVos was aligned with support for “families,” the “nation,”
and “communities,” while opposition to the nominee was portrayed as an attempt to
“obstruct” progress, thereby supporting “foreign” ideals and being on the “wrong” side of
the “fight.” The use of words like “foreign” and “wrong” triggers an affective response,
automatically prompting the audience to take a side. This strategy, combined with the
brevity of Republicans’ remarks compared to those of Democrats and their relative lack
of concrete support for DeVos’ qualifications or support from voters, indicates that
Republicans were not attempting to persuade Democrats to vote for DeVos. Rather, their
messages appear to target wavering Republican senators as well as members of their base
to concretize the “party line” that rationalized support for the nominee.
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The fundamentally different use of moral language by the majority and minority
parties reflects a divergence of purpose: Democrats sought to persuade an additional
Republican senator to vote against DeVos, while Republicans sought to maintain their
pro-DeVos position as the clock ran down. The patterns identified from MFD analysis of
each party’s word choices in Senate floor speeches supports the thesis that Democrats
were continually engaged in purposeful attempts to persuade members of the opposite
party, while Republican moral language choices indicate a focus on intra-party
consilience rather than an inter-party dialogue.
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VII. Discussion and Conclusions
On February 7, 2017, Republicans carried the day with Vice President Pence’s
tiebreaking vote and DeVos was confirmed as Secretary of Education, but the
controversy ignited by her confirmation process continues to burn well into her tenure. A
poll conducted in September 2017—seven months into DeVos’ service as Education
Secretary—found that only 28% of respondents had “very favorable” or “somewhat
favorable” views of DeVos, while 40% viewed her unfavorably (Glum, 2017, para. 2).
DeVos became one of many Trump administration officials to be portrayed satirically by
Kate McKinnon on Saturday Night Live’s Weekend Update, and McKinnon’s impression
emphasized DeVos’ cluelessness and elitism while maintaining the Secretary’s neverwavering smile.
Jost: So, Betsy, what happened with that interview?
DeVos: Well, I think the problem is that the words that were coming out of my
mouth were bad, and that is because they came from my brain.
…
Jost: You might now be the most protested member of Trump’s cabinet. Why do
you think that is?
DeVos: You know, I think it’s because I do not do a good job… and I can’t
because I don’t know how.
…
Jost: Can I just ask you something: do you like your job?
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DeVos: No, I do not. I spend most of it getting screamed at while climbing into an
Escalade, but I do like visiting good school (sic) and doing worksheets with cute
little blacks and the occasional stinky poor white.
Jost: “Stinky poor white…” [laughs] Secretary DeVos, do you really want to say
that on TV?
DeVos: Oh, I did a fudge. Oh… Look, I may not be very good on camera, but
behind the scenes my ideas are much worse. (Saturday Night Live, 2018)
DeVos also suffered a setback when her appearance before the House Appropriations
Committee led to many of her personal initiatives going unfunded in the next education
budget (see Balingit & Douglas-Gabriel, 2018). Thus, although Trump’s nominee was
confirmed and became Secretary of Education, her time in that position has been fraught
with protests, criticisms, and few accomplishments. These actions suggest that the
historic and overwhelmingly anti-DeVos sentiments Democrats referred to on the Senate
floor were, in fact, present across the country and did not subside in intensity following
the nominee’s confirmation. Though Democrats failed to derail DeVos confirmation vote,
their naming of the nominee appears to have represented the sentiments of (at least) a
plurality of U.S. Americans. Having completed RSI and MFT analyses of Senators’
official remarks throughout the varied stages of the confirmation process, this section will
now detail implications and insights from those analyses that situate this research within
the context of formative literature on the subject of political persuasion.
The confirmation process for Betsy DeVos was one of the most contentious
debates over a Trump cabinet appointee and it was the first time in the history of the
Department of Education that a vice presidential tie-breaking vote was needed, indicating
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that the rhetoric employed by Democrats and Republicans in the Senate was more likely
than ever to be aimed at persuading members of the opposite party. Given the polarized
nature of U.S. American political rhetoric around the time of President Trump’s election
and the bipartisan efforts made to stop DeVos, this case study represents an ideal venue
in which to analyze the persuasive practices of elected political elites. The following
paragraphs will examine the DeVos confirmation debate and draw conclusions about
political persuasion in the United States, the implications of this study on Moral
Foundations Theory, the Rhetoric of Social Intervention model, and the importance of
making messages “feel right” to audiences as a key criterion for persuasive success in
contemporary political discourse.
First, DeVos’ confirmation hearings provide insights for Rauch and Wittes’
(2017) modern anti-institutional populism and Cramer’s (2016) theory of rural
consciousness. Initially, DeVos’ confirmation and self-portrayal as an advocate for poor
children and their families makes her candidacy the epitome of what Rauch and Wittes’
(2017) termed modern anti-institutional populism, or populism that has an “instinctive
suspicion of anything or anyone deemed ‘elite’” (p. 8). However, the authors note that
such a populist intent often under-emphasizes the fact that “like it or not, most of what
government does simply must be decided by specialists and professionals” (p. 7).
Therefore, DeVos, whom Senator Scott described as both a political newcomer and
someone very experienced in education policy, was appealing to politiphobes (see Rauch
[2016]) with little or no interest in learning about the complexities of running the
Department of Education. As Senator Scott described DeVos:
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I will tell you, she brings with her a fresh set of eyes; that, yes, she has no official
experience, but she has invested the last 28 years of her life in improving public
education. She has supported, without any question, the creation of public charter
schools. (162[20 pt. II] Cong. Rec. S767, 2017)
Though inherently contradictory (how can someone with 28 years experience in
education also be someone with a fresh set of eyes unless she was truly never adequately
involved with education?), this argument is appealing to politiphobes who believe that
“commonsense solutions to the country’s problems” (Rauch, 2016, para. 46) exist but are
not enacted because political elites are corrupt. DeVos, on the contrary, was portrayed as
an outsider and, therefore, not a part of the corrupt political class, while her experience in
charter schools indicated she possessed knowledge of a deus ex machina solution to U.S.
Americans’ dissatisfaction with the state of public education. Also consistent with
modern anti-institutional populism, it seemed not to matter that DeVos, a former chair of
the Michigan Republican Party and billionaire contributor to countless conservative
causes, was very much a part of the corrupt system such politiphobes identify as the
problem.
Furthermore, Democrats’ heavy foregrounding of letters from their constituents is
also consistent with an adherence to the folk theory of democracy, which “assumes that,
almost by definition, more public involvement will produce more representative and thus
more effective and legitimate governance” (Rauch & Wittes, 2017, p. 3). However, the
avalanche of constituent outcry against DeVos did not change the outcome of the
confirmation vote. Republicans, it seems, don’t hesitate to use winning strategies like
modern anti-institutional populism to appeal to politiphobes and achieve their policy
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goals, while Democrats’ more readily adhere to the folk theory of democracy that has “a
deep tendency to disappoint in practice” (p. 3). Perhaps to defeat Republican tactics,
Democrats need to cede the “higher ground” and choose rhetorical strategies based on
their effectiveness in appealing to voters’ values and emotions first before reverting to
supporting their ideas’ logical or ideological supremacy.
While Republicans’ tactics indicated they targeted politiphobic U.S. Americans—
many of whom supported Trump—to leverage support for DeVos, Democrats were
successful in targeting another key Trump voter demographic by invoking rural
consciousness: rural Americans. During the HELP Committee hearing, Democrats rarely
mentioned the challenges faced by rural school districts, like those in Wyoming and
Alaska. However, during the Senate floor speeches, Democrats the inability of charter
schools to help public school students in rural areas. This may indicate a shift in strategy
by Democrats, who recognized after hearing from their constituents that many Trump
supporters were also dissatisfied with DeVos. Thus, they subsequently decided to
tactically foreground how the nominee’s one-size-fits-all plan for helping underserved
students would not help students in rural and, therefore, often primarily conservative,
areas. In doing so, the Senate Democrats did what Hillary Clinton’s presidential
campaign could not: harness political resentment to activate rural consciousness. Rural
consciousness, as developed by Cramer (2016), is a mindset held by citizens in rural
areas that rests on three tenets:
(1) a belief that rural areas are ignored by decision makers, including policy
makers, (2) a perception that rural areas do not get their fair share of resources,
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and (3) a sense that rural folks have fundamentally distinct values and lifestyles,
which are misunderstood and disrespected by city folks. (p. 12)
Republicans, who heavily foregrounded DeVos’ record as a savior for students—
typically poor or underprivileged students living in urban centers—who had no other
choices, may have been trying to portray Democrats as hypocrites for not protecting a
traditional Democratic voting base but, in doing so, Republicans alienated a voting base
of their own. For many rural districts, K-12 schools are a major center of public life,
whether through community attendance at football games or parental involvement in
parent-teacher associations. By trying to sell DeVos as a champion Democrats should get
behind because of her support for inner-city youth, Republicans failed to adequately
defend rural voters for whom DeVos’ policies would not work, thereby meeting the first
criterion of rural consciousness.
Democrats, however, actively foregrounded the quandary DeVos’ nomination
placed rural communities in (Democrats used the word rural 77 times in Senate floor
speeches, compared to Republicans’ five) by pointing out the difficulty of transporting
students to school in geographically vast districts and the fact these districts also struggle
to maintain quality educational programs at their current levels of funding. Creating
charter schools would not, therefore, help any rural community, but rather create more
problems and divert resources away from existing rural schools. This argumentation
addresses every concern inherent in rural consciousness, thereby showing rural
constituents that: (1) Democrats were intent on representing rural voices in policy
discussion; (2) Democrats understood rural areas already have a difficult time receiving
their fair share of resources; and (3) that Democrats’ are aware of the difficult realities of
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rural life that would make implementing charter schools challenging or impossible.
Though Cramer (2016) indicated Republicans have traditionally been more effective at
“tapping into existing resentments” (p. 222) like rural consciousness, Democrats certainly
outperformed Republicans in this area while arguing against the confirmation of Betsy
DeVos. This indicates the rural voting bloc, though often associated with traditionallyRepublican values, is not owned entirely by either party and can be engaged by
politicians who recognize the particular set of concerns with government that come with
living in a rural place.
While Democrats excelled in activating rural consciousness, their efforts to
persuade Republicans tended toward central route appeals that may not have appealed to
rationally ignorant members of the public. Democrats tend to conceptualize persuasion as
something that takes place in a “dispassionate mind that makes decisions by weighing the
evidence and reasoning to the most valid conclusions” (Westen, 2007, p. ix) despite
considerable evidence to the contrary, and this was generally the case throughout the
senators’ rhetoric on DeVos. While politically-active audiences, who likely already had a
set opinion on whether or not they supported DeVos, may be persuaded by central route
appeals to logic and evidence, rationally ignorant members of the U.S. public often glaze
over when presented with such arguments about government policy; after all, “most
voters are rationally underinformed, irrationally biased, and have no compelling reason to
be otherwise” (Rauch & Wittes, 2017, p. 6) as their one vote is unlikely to be determinate
in any election. Therefore, Democrats’ efforts to differentiate between “charter schools”
and what they named DeVos’ support for privatization as a strategy designed for profit
likely had limited effects on the voting public. While such technical arguments may have
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been persuasive to Republican senators, it is worth noting that Republican rhetoric was
considerably less specific and more in line with what Maddalena (2016) termed messages
that “feel right” to an audience and “start the engine of imagination” (p. 248) rather than
messages that encourage central processing and critical thinking. Democrats, on the other
hand, argued in a way that would better appeal to highly attentive audiences prepared to
process a message critically, as they created arguments that expected audiences to
analyze both the literal meaning of their messages and the context in which they were
delivered. Logically-driven arguments delivered in an overnight series of speeches on the
Senate floor undoubtedly appealed to politically-active audiences, but they lacked the
simplicity and vagueness typified by politicians like Trump that allowed voters to project
what they wanted to hear or see onto a candidate. Though the Democrats’ arguments did
seem to accurately represent the views of their constituents, they still failed to stop
DeVos’ confirmation; then again, if their goal was to tarnish DeVos’ reputation and, by
extension, the president’s reputation, their anomaly-featuring communication certainly
achieved that goal. Going forward, Democrats must choose whether they will continue
adhering to the rational mind theory when designing persuasive messages or if they will
rely more heavily on intuitive, affective argumentative tactics to activate moral frames
within their audiences’ minds.
Democrats use of moral language and focus on family and community, however,
did defy Lakoff’s (1995) expectation that Republicans had a near monopoly on moral and
family rhetoric. As he wrote, “Liberals are less insightful than conservatives at
recognizing that morality and the family lie at the center of their political universe. The
cost to liberals has been enormous” (p. 202). Lakoff (2011) later asserted that this failure
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stemmed from the Democrats’ lack of an effective communication system for naming and
framing issues. However, as MFD analyses from each of the three stages of rhetoric
concerning the DeVos confirmation showed, Democrats often invoked moral language
from the ingroup/loyalty foundation, which places a heavy emphasis on words like
“family,” “community,” and the good of the “nation” (see Appendix A). In fact,
ingroup/loyalty was the primary moral foundation invoked by Senator Murray in the
HELP Committee hearing, and the second most frequently invoked in Democratic
senators’ press releases and speeches on the Senate floor (see Tables 2, 4, and 8). Though
considerable time has passed since Lakoff’s (1995) assertion that Democrats failed to
adequately centralize their political narratives around the “family,” Lakoff (2011)
indicated this problem has continued into the 21st century. Whether a development since
2011 or a circumstance specific to Democrats’ beliefs on education, Democratic
arguments against DeVos focused heavily on the impact of this nomination on families
and communities, thereby flouting expectations of past research on Democratic framing
systems.
Second, analysis of both parties’ arguments using Moral Foundations Theory
tended to support existing characterizations of both Democratic and Republican uses of
moral rhetoric. Republicans tended to emphasize the ingroup/loyalty and
authority/respect foundations consistently, but only invoked the harm/care and
fairness/reciprocity foundations in a meaningful way when Democrats were present. The
highest level of Republican use of the two “liberal foundations” peaked in the HELP
Committee, indicating they hoped to frame their argument in a way that appealed to their
Democratic colleagues. However, the relative non-presence of these two types of appeals
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in Republican press releases and on the Senate floor indicated the rest of their messaging
was intended to appeal to their voting base or that their moral persuasive efforts did not
effectively target Democrats; given the Republican majority in the Senate, the former
seems more likely.
Unlike Republicans, who stuck mostly to traditionally-conservative appeals and
barely engaged the Democrats, the Democrats emphasized language from the
conservative ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect foundations, indicating the
construction of moral arguments likely to appeal to Republicans. The inflation of these
two foundations may indicate a competent persuasive effort to engage elected officials
with different ideologies than those espoused by Democrats, but this could also be a
manifestation of the “ethic of autonomy” (Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 102) that undergirds
liberal and libertarian belief systems. As Haidt and Graham (2007) explain, liberal and
libertarian ideologies rest on the assumption that “rights, justice, fairness, and freedom
are moral goods because they help to maximize the autonomy of individuals, and to
protect individuals from harms perpetrated by authorities and by other individuals” (p.
102). Democrats’ perception of Republican obstreperousness on DeVos as a threat to
individual citizens’ rights to receive an education could have triggered such moral
language usage, making it possible the Democrats’ use of traditionally-conservative
moral foundations more accurately reflects their feelings about education and civil rights
protections like IDEA than an intentional effort to “speak Republican.” In either event,
the presence of multiple conservative and liberal moral foundations in Democratic speech
demonstrates they did make arguments that could appeal to more people outside their
own ideological system than Republicans did.
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Third, the Rhetoric of Social Intervention model proved ideal for an analysis of
political rhetoric that contained so many different attempts to name one nominee’s
experience. The names Democrats created for DeVos relied heavily on anomaly-featuring
communication aimed at inducing deviance in Republicans. Pointing out gaps in names
for experience can create deviance, or “the difference between what our ideology leads us
to expect will happen in experience and what actually seems to happen” (Opt & Gring,
2009, p. 83), which, much like cognitive dissonance, may induce people to make changes
to their ideological systems to better explain their experience. This strategy of creating
deviance, which sought to remind Republicans of how supporting DeVos ran counter to
traditional norms of government and beliefs about what constitutes responsible
representation, was present across all naming shifts the Democrats’ attempted,
representing a concerted effort to use naming as a means of inducing persuasion.
Additionally, the Democrats’ self-name of loyal opposition was a key support for their
behavior and persuasive strategies, and it also represents the perpetual presence of a
holographic power intervention alongside each of the Democrats’ attention interventions.
Per the RSI model, interventions within a subsystem are often holographic in that “each
subsystem… contains information about the whole ideological system” (p. 77); in other
words, while this analysis foregrounded the attention intervention aspects of each
Democratic attempt to rename Republicans’ normalization of DeVos, the other
subsystems were still at play in the background. Democrats’ loyal opposition name was
evidenced by their initial openness to hear from DeVos, which then led to their principled
opposition after her answers failed to satisfy them and they were duty-bound to safeguard
institutions against incompetent management (see Webber, 2017 for more on loyal
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opposition). This name represents a complementary and competitive power intervention,
as Democrats emphasized their obligation as a minority party to scrutinize the majority
party’s nominees—indicating a complementary power-share—and also offered a
competing naming system for DeVos’ qualifications. Given Senate Democrats’
simultaneous emphasis on reinterpreting names for DeVos as well as reinforcing their
responsibility as the minority party, the Rhetoric of Social Intervention model proved the
ideal method for analyzing the holographic interventions and competing naming systems
active in this case study.
Fourth, at the outset, this thesis sought to identify why U.S. Americans have such
a difficult time communicating across political lines and whether the polarization in U.S.
politics is driven from the top-down by political elites or from the bottom-up by average
citizens. Existing research (e.g., Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Haidt, 2012; Westen, 2007)
suggested that this is potentially because U.S. Americans tend to craft persuasive
messages that they themselves would find logically and morally impactful, rather than
critically analyzing the positionality and belief system of their intended audience. The
case study analysis presented here examined the rhetoric of elected political elites as they
debated the qualifications of a contentious nominee for U.S. cabinet secretary who faced
bipartisan opposition and concluded that Democrats presented arguments that invoked
traditionally-conservative moral and political values. Though this was an unusual
situation—bipartisanship has become even more rare in Washington under the Trump
Administration—this indicates that it is possible for political elites to engage in audiencecentered persuasive attempts, even if those attempts fall on deaf ears. Additionally, it
found that Republicans were more likely to invoke typically-liberal moral foundations
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when Democrats were in the room and then revert to using primarily conservative
appeals in press releases meant for public and media consumption. This would indicate
that while average U.S. Americans may “spontaneously craft messages grounded in their
own sense of morality” (Feinberg & Willer, 2015, p. 1665), professional politicians do
adapt their messages to appeal to their audience’s moral and political beleifs.
Though it is unsurprising that politicians would use different tactics when
engaging the opposition party versus members of their base, Republican support for
DeVos never wavered despite the overwhelming amount of evidence and number of
arguments presented both by their Democratic colleagues and their constituents. This
suggests that, while Democrats may have adopted an effective persuasive stance, their
audience was not open to being persuaded. Though Senators Collins and Murkowski
defected from the Republican ranks to vote against DeVos, their defection was not
necessarily the result of Democratic persuasion. After all, Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell still got all the votes he needed to confirm the President’s nominee; Cillizza
(2017) suggested that McConnell allowed Collins and Murkowski to defect because
“both [Collins and Murkowski are] moderates sitting in rural states where a ‘no’ vote on
DeVos was smart politics” (para. 8) and noted that the two senators announced their
opposition within hours of each other. If Collins and Murkowski’s defection was, as
Cillizza (2017) suggested, a calculated move sanctioned by Republican leaders, it is
unlikely that Democratic resistance and attempts at persuasion could ever have swayed
another Republican to defy McConnell. As Cillizza put it, “The drama over whether
DeVos was going to be confirmed wasn’t drama at all. Not really. It was the carefully
laid plan of a master vote-counter who knew exactly how much he could give and gave
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it” (para. 13). Though this would explain why no Republicans were swayed by
Democrats’ arguments, it fails to answer the question about the source of America’s
polarization and, instead, raises a new question: if decisions aren’t made based on the
quality of arguments or the demonstrated will of U.S. voters, what are they based on? The
openly partisan nature of Republican support for DeVos suggests future attempts to
achieve desired outcomes in legislative settings should not focus on crafting superior
arguments, but rather on adopting effective tactics in the face of political opposition that
is uninterested in anything but winning. In this way, congressional hearings and
nomination fights are less like debates in courtrooms and more like reality TV shows that
allow the audience to vote for their favorite contestants.
Finally, this case study supports previous communication research that indicates
persuasion begins with matching a persuasive message to the audience’s orientation
toward a subject; put another way, persuasion begins not with evidence or logic but with
creating a sense of “feeling right.” If, as Westen (2007) and Haidt (2001) suggest, the
rational mind approach to persuasion does not accurately reflect cognitive science, this
finding has implications for the way the communication discipline approaches
persuasion. The emphasis on “feeling right,” in some ways represents a departure from
traditional communication education paradigms; Rothwell (2016) encourages speakers to
focus on supporting claims with evidence.
Gaining and maintaining the attention of your audience increase (sic) the
likelihood that your carefully prepared speech will resonate with listeners. An
effective introduction gets your speech off to a good start, and an effective
conclusion ends it with a bang. Backing your claims and bolstering your
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arguments with supporting materials used effectively are critical elements of
competent public speaking. Style—the way that you use language to express your
ideas—should be clear, precise, and vivid. (p. 369)
While Rothwell’s advice is not wrong, it seems this “evidence-based” paradigm is
pervasive in introductory public speaking courses (see Morreale, Hugenberg, and
Worley, 2006 for more on public speaking basic course textbooks). As this thesis has
shown, “feeling right” to an audience is as—or more—important as the message being
sent, because “feeling wrong” may prevent that message from being received in the first
place. Though this seems like a refutation of the common speech education paradigm,
“feeling right” could represent a return to focusing on audience analysis and Burkean
identification as a means of affecting persuasion. In 1950, Burke defined identification by
writing, “You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech,
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (p. 55).
Though most speech textbooks, including Rothwell (2016), mention these elements, this
thesis suggests that the centrality of identification and audience analysis to persuasive
success is underemphasized in the current approaches.
While this thesis provided an extensive review of literature on political persuasion
and moral rhetoric, its findings are limited by its focus on members of the United States
Senate in a single case study. Though this was intentional, this focus on elite discourse
functioned to explain and describe how professional politicians communicate without
examining the impact of these rhetorical maneuvers on average voters. Additionally,
analysis of Democrats’ moral language usage on an issue like education policy, which
has clear links to families and communities, may have yielded an artificially high rate of
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language in the ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect foundations and examining a
different case (even a different confirmation hearing) may have revealed different
findings. Additionally, the unique context in which confirmation hearings take place
presents a unique set of constraints and may, therefore, be a unique form of rhetoric.
Also, while this thesis has been critical of Republicans’ rhetoric, this study is more
focused on the interplay between the majority and minority parties in the Senate. Both
parties, to be sure, have been guilty of playing politics instead of representing all
constituencies when they hold power; it is possible that an identical analysis of a
controversial nominee passing the Senate while Democrats held the chamber’s majority
would yield similar results. Future research on this subject should further analyze the
responses of voters to the types of arguments made by politicians in similarly contentious
debates to measure the real impact of elite discourse on a broader range of publics. Future
research should also examine situations where Democrats hold a majority, to elucidate if
these findings are indicative of a divide between Democratic and Republican rhetorical
strategies or those of majority and minority powerholders. Additionally, more analyses of
Senate debates using Moral Foundations Theory could provide insights into the use of
moral language on issues other than education, which would add context to the findings
of this study. Prospective research on confirmation hearings as a rhetorical genre would
also do well to utilize the Rhetoric of Social Intervention model, which provides a
capable method for dissecting the continual backgrounding and foregrounding of
information that occurs when ideological systems collide.
Though Donald Trump’s election was shocking to many observers of politics, his
formation of one of the richest and least-qualified Cabinets in history also created a
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unique series of confirmation hearings that highlighted the polarized nature of U.S.
American political rhetoric. After a rhetorical analysis of the interventions employed by
Democrats against Trump’s nomination of Betsy DeVos as Education Secretary, it is
clear that political elites in the United States are capable of designing effective persuasive
appeals that account for the moral beliefs of their audience. If this capability exists, the
question is no longer “why can’t we communicate across political lines,” but rather “what
will it take for us use our skills and put country before party?”

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

141

VIII. Appendices
Appendix A: The DeVos Moral Foundations Dictionary
The following list of words comprises the DeVos Moral Foundations Dictionary,
for use with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program as modified from
the original Moral Foundations Dictionary (see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
Superscripts indicate words or word stems that are listed under multiple foundations.
Harm/care (1): Safe*, peace*, compassion*, empath*, sympath*, care, caring,
protect*, shield, shelter, amity, secur*, benefit*, defen*, guard*, preserve45, harm*,
suffer*, war, wars, warl*, warring, fight*, violen*, hurt*, kill, kills, killer, killed, killing,
endanger*, cruel*, brutal*, abuse*, damag*, ruin*5, ravage, detriment*, crush*, attack*,
annihilate*, destroy, stomp, abandon*3, spurn, impair, exploit*5, wound*
Fairness/reciprocity (2): Fair, fairly, fairness, fair-*, fairmind*, fairplay, equal*,
justice, justness, justifi*, reciproc*, impartial*, egalitar*, rights, equity, evenness,
equivalent, unbias*, tolerant, equable, balance*, homologous, unprejudice*, reasonable,
constant, honest*6, accountab*, unfair*, uequal*, bias*, unjust*, injust*, bigot*,
discriminat*, disproportion*, inequitable, prejud*, dishonest, unscrupulous, dissociate,
preference, favoritism, segregat*3, exclusion, exclud*, unaccountab*
Ingroup/loyalty (3): Together, nation*, homeland*, family, families, familial,
group, loyal*4, patriot*, communal, commune*, communit*, communis*, comrad*,
cadre, collectiv*, joint, unison, fellow*, guild, solidarity, devot*, cliqu*, cohort, ally,
insider, foreign*, enem*, betray*4, treason*4, traitor*4, treacher*4, disloyal*4, individual*,
apostasy45, apostate45, deserted4, deserter*4, deserting4, deceiv*, jilt*, imposter,
miscreant, spy, sequester, renegade, terroris*, immigra*

POLARIZATION, POPULISM, AND MORAL FOUNDATIONS

142

Authority/respect (4): Obey*, obedien*, duty, law, lawful*6, legal*6, duti*,
honor*, respect, respectful*, respected, respects, order*, father*, mother, motherl*,
mothering, mothers, tradition*, hierarch*, authorit*, permit, permission, status*, rank*,
leader*, class, bourgeoisie, caste*, position, complian*, command, supremacy, control,
submi*, allegian*, serve, abide, defere*, defer, revere*, venerat*, comply, experienc*6,
expertise6, competen*6, precedent, precedence, defian*, rebel*, dissent*, subver*,
disrespect*, disobe*, sediti*, agitat*, insubordinat*, illegal*, lawlwess*, insurgent,
mutinous, defy*, dissident, unfaithful, alienate, defector, heretic*5, nonconformist,
oppose, protest, refuse, denounce, remonstrate, riot*, obstruct, inexperienc*6, amateur*6,
incompeten*6, unqualified, unprecedented
Purity/sanctity (5): Piety6, pious6, purity, pure*, clean*, steril*, sacred*, chast*,
holy, holiness, saint*, wholesome*, celiba*, abstention, austerity, integrity6, modesty,
abstinen*, abstemiousness, upright6, limpid, unadulterated, maiden, virtuous, refined,
decen*6, immaculate, innocent, pristine, church*, disgust*, deprav*, disease*, unclean*,
contagio*, indecen*6, sin, sinful*, sinner*, sins, sinned, sinning, slut*, whore, dirt*,
impiety, impious, profan*, gross, repuls*, sick*, promiscu*, lewd*, adulter*, debauche*,
defile*, tramp, prostitut*, unchaste, intemperate, wanton, profligate, filth*, trashy,
obscene*, lax, taint*, stain*, tarnish*, debase*, desecrat*, wicked*6, blemish, exploitat*,
pervert, wretched6
Morality general (6): Righteous*, moral*, ethic*, value*, upstanding, good,
goodness, principle*, blameless, exemplary, lesson, canon, doctrine, noble, worth*,
ideal*, praiseworthy, commendable, character, proper, laudable, correct, wrong*, evil,
immoral*, bad, offend*, offensive*, transgress*
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H.E.L.P. Committee
Senator

Affiliation

Word Count

Lamar Alexander

R-TN

961

Orrin Hatch

R-UT

521

Patty Murray

D-WA

1605

Tim Scott

R-SC

641

Senator

Affiliation

Word Count

Lamar Alexander

R-TN

359

Tammy Baldwin

D-WI

295

Michael Bennet

D-CO

494

Bob Casey

D-PA

332

Bill Cassidy

R-LA

127

Susan Collins

R-ME

674

Mike Enzi

R-WY

211

Al Franken

D-MN

444

Maggie Hassan

D-NH

933

Johnny Isakson

R-GA

563

Tim Kaine

D-VA

1314

Lisa Murkowski

R-AL

152

Chris Murphy

D-CT

1163

Patty Murray

D-WA

184

Pat Roberts

R-KS

631

Elizabeth Warren

D-MA

800

Sheldon Whitehouse

D-RI

1046
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Floor Speeches
Senator

Affiliation

Word Count

Lamar Alexander

R-TN

4297

Tammy Baldwin

D-WI

1394

Michael Bennet

D-CO

3283

Richard Blumenthal

D-CT

4368

Cory Booker

D-NJ

5190

Sherrod Brown

D-OH

2304

Ben Cardin

D-MD

1635

Tom Carper

D-DE

1738

Bob Casey

D-PA

7320

Chris Coons

D-DE

2418

John Cornyn

R-TX

1761

Joe Donnelly

D-IN

1586

Tammy Duckworth

D-IL

216

Dick Durbin

D-IL

6093

Diane Feinstein

D-CA

599

Al Franken

D-MN

4522

Kirsten Gillibrand

D-NY

1064

Kamala Harris

D-CA

2226

Maggie Hassan

D-NH

3429

Martin Heinrich

D-NM

1125

Heidi Heitkamp

D-ND

2734

Mazie Hirono

D-HI

855

Tim Kaine

D-VA

9225

Amy Klobuchar

D-MN

2647

James Lankford

R-OK

1660

Patrick Leahy

D-VT

1404

Joe Manchin

D-WV

2517

Ed Markey

D-MA

1712
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Claire McCaskill

D-MO

419

Mitch McConnell

R-KY

842

Robert Menendez

D-NJ

2210

Jeff Merkley

D-OR

7053

Chris Murphy

D-CT

6705

Patty Murray

D-WA

21196

Gary Peters

D-MI

1895

Jack Reed

D-RI

3810

Brian Schatz

D-HI

8918

Chuck Schumer

D-NY

2039

Tim Scott

R-SC

3194

Jeanne Shaheen

D-NH

2298

Debbie Stabenow

D-MI

1938

Jon Tester

D-MT

2720

Tom Udall

D-NM

2040

Chris Van Hollen

D-MD

6650

Mark Warner

D-VA

1622

Elizabeth Warren

D-MA

7548

Sheldon Whitehouse

D-RI

5892

Ron Wyden

D-OR

2161

145
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